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ABSTRACT 
Nepal faced a ten year long Maoist insurgency problem when the Communist Party of Nepal, 
CPN (Maoist) declared war in 1996 by rejecting the fundamental premises of Nepal’s 
constitutional monarchy and parliamentary system established in 1990 and ended with a 
comprehensive peace agreement in 2006. A decade-long insurgency and counterinsurgency 
claimed many lives, destruction of infrastructure, internally displacement of people, and crossing 
over to India. Insurgency compelled to bear direct, indirect and hidden cost to the nation.  
The purpose of this study is to develop a computer simulation model to yield valuable insights 
into dynamics of insurgency evolution, determine insurgency mitigating conditions and estimate 
cost of the insurgency. The main hypothesis of this research is that the lack of understanding of 
the dynamics of insurgency development and mitigation has contributed to the cost of the 
conflict. The study aims to apply system Dynamics (SD) methodology with conflict 
transformation theory to examine the development, management and cost of conflict.  
The fundamental proposition of this study is that an insurgency must be analyzed within a 
system in which all behavior is produced related to the insurgency. The utility of the model 
designed in this study is not limited to insurgency in Nepal, rather the implication of 
understanding and analyzing the war on terrorism as a global insurgency. It indicates a shift in 
the main emphasis for the conduct of the insurgency or counterinsurgency activities. The primary 
emphasis must shift to, and remain on the population. Instead of applying the majority of the 
resources to answering the insurgency with the military response, the insurgency analysis 
suggests that focusing on the insurgent’s support base and resources is a more effective method 
of defeating them. Achieving popular support strengthens the security force ability to combat the 
insurgent while at the same time drain the insurgent’s ability to commit violent incident.  
The study finds that fully reliance on armed solution might not be a good answer for any conflict. 
The cost of armed conflict might always be greater than its benefit. The core insight gained from 
this study, the most powerful instrument that shapes the future of peace and security, is the self-
examination of costs and dynamics of the insurgency. The major recommendations of this study 
on the basis of findings are:  
First, the insurgency should not be thought of in military terms only, but it should be scrutinized 
in light of the national strategy and the implementation of state capacity elements. Military, 
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diplomatic, socio-economic, governance and legislative efforts all must be synchronized and 
united toward achieving the common principal objective, the defeat of the insurgent and its 
underlying causes. Addressing transitional security requires improving the elements of national 
power including democracy and governance.  
Second, the effort for the state must be to gain popular support, which gives legitimacy to the 
security force operation. It provides the necessary intelligence to locate the insurgent members 
and removes the recruitment base from the potential insurgent. Insurgents do also rely on public 
support, without public support to them; the resources needed for their survival and actions are 
no longer available. 
Third, the security force must limit the use of direct action against the insurgent without having 
good intelligence so as to minimize innocent casualties. The state should focus on moderating 
their recruitment base by improving state capacity elements such as the governance, 
employment, legitimacy and the economy.  
Fourth, the short and mid-range strategies should be designed to disrupt and control the 
insurgency while the long-range strategy should focus on ideological support to the insurgent 
and the culture of violence.  
Fifth, Continuous sincere effort must move toward socio-economic-political reform in post-
conflict situation to prevent the country being trapped into further conflict.  
Sixth, Insurgency, organized crimes and insecurity, should not be limited to the burden of the 
country concerned, rather recognize the problem of the international community as a whole. The 
state should emphasize gaining support of the international community for moral and resource 
support.  
Seventh, cost of the conflict tends to be incorrectly perceived and underestimated. Economic 
losses haves long term impacts on the economy, therefore, should be given proper attention and 
dedicated policies should be sought to minimize the adverse economic effects.   
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
 
Conflict is a dispute between two opposing groups, external or internal to the country. An 
example of an external dispute is state-to-state conflict, which is on the decline globally. Internal 
conflicts have resulted in three times as many casualties as wars between states since World War 
II. Internal conflict can also be classified into two categories as conflicts against the state (i.e. 
civil war) and the people-to-people conflict (i.e. ethnic conflict) (Fearon and Laitin, 2003 cited 
on Ghani and Iyer, 2010). More than 70 civil wars have happened around the world since 1945, 
claiming around 20 million deaths and displacing more than 67 million people (Collier and 
Sambanis, 2005 cited in Do and Iyer, 2009). Insurgency can be defined as the political warfare 
with low-intensity violence intending to change public policies and possibly to overthrow the 
current regime. Insurgency has become a strategically significant form of asymmetric conflict 
over the past century (Marks, 2003). It has become an effective alternative to conventional 
warfare due to better communication with increased propaganda from both sides, loss of lives, 
economic losses, destruction of infrastructure, and increased acceptance of violence (Collier et 
al., 2003; Anderson, 2006). 
Nepal faced a ten year long Maoist insurgency problem when the Communist Party of Nepal, 
CPN (Maoist) declared war in 1996 by rejecting the fundamental premises of Nepal’s 
constitutional monarchy, and parliamentary system established in 1990 by the popular movement 
called Jan Andolan I (Ra and Sing, 2005; Do and Iyer, 2009). A decade-long insurgency and 
counterinsurgency claimed more than 16000 lives, 400000 families displaced internally, and 
thousands were crossing over to India. Costs of insurgency include the destruction of more than 
3800 police stations and government offices. The opportunity cost of lost output counted more 
than 3 percent of current GDP (Upreti, 2006; Pradhan 2009; Shakya, 2009; World Bank, 2010). 
Why was Nepal trapped into violent conflict? There has been much academic work trying to 
examine causes and consequences of conflict in Nepal. Simkhada and Oliva (2005) have 
published a comprehensively annotated bibliography comprising 34 books and monographs, 45 
academic articles, 92 reports, research studies and working papers, and nine miscellaneous items. 
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They applied different methods and techniques for understanding and analyzing causes and 
consequences of conflict. Some explained social inequality, exclusion of a large section of 
society from the fabrication of political power and sharing of resources as the underlying causes 
of conflict. Some other described the rise of Maoist and its violent campaign within the 
historical-structural conditions, religion-culture of cast-based discrimination, post-1990 
constitutional and political practices as well as regional and international context. Poverty and 
unemployment have been perceived as the important contributing factors of violent conflict in 
Nepal. Similarly, for some other the feudal beneficiaries that have monopolized political power 
for centuries are to blame for insurgency uprising in Nepal (Simkhada and Oliva, 2005). 
However, none of the studies used a System Dynamics approach to examining insurgency 
dynamics in Nepal. 
The purpose of this study is to develop a computer simulation model to: (1) yield valuable 
insights into dynamics of insurgency evolution (2) determine under which conditions 
insurgencies might be mitigated and (3) estimate to what extent insurgency affects economic 
performance of the country. 
While not analyzing underlying reasons for the conflict, my main hypothesis of this research is 
that the lack of understanding of the dynamics of insurgency development and mitigation has 
contributed to the cost of the conflict. According to Herbert Simon human beings' judgment is 
governed by "bounded rationality" cannot capture the entire dynamics of conflict and peace 
(1983 p19 cited in Dahal, 2010). For this reason, it also seems worthwhile to examine why 
conflict in Nepal has not disappeared entirely even after "Comprehensive Peace Agreement" 
(CPA) of November 21, 2006, confirmed by the government and the Maoist. The Constituent 
Assembly (CA) election of April 10, 2008 has further strengthened the tendency of conflict as it 
has transformed the state-centric conflict into society-centric. It has created a new bargaining 
environment beyond the mandate of CPA (Dahal, 2010). In particular, this study concentrates on 
dynamics of Maoist insurgency and its associated cost in Nepal. 
The forces at play during and after conflict are complex and do not come under the scope of any 
single academic discipline. Hence, the study on conflict is interdisciplinary; economists, 
sociologists, political scientists, military theorists, member of civil society and relief 
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organization, and operation research analysts have all made contributions to understanding 
conflict and its impact (Richardson, 2004). In this research, System Dynamics approach is 
applied in studying the interconnected cause and effect relationships of conflict. System 
dynamics modeling allows the researcher to analyze complex system from a cause-and-effect 
perspective, rather than from a statistical standpoint. System dynamics also provide flexibility to 
the researcher to utilize both conceptual understandings, as well as empirical data (Gil et al., 
2005; Choucri et al. 2006). 
Therefore, this study aims to apply system Dynamics (SD) methodology with conflict 
transformation theory to examine the development, management and cost of conflict. The 
fundamental proposition of this study is that an insurgency must be analyzed within a system in 
which all behavior is produced related to the insurgency. In line with this premise, efforts are 
made to determine variables included in the system and to analyze their behavior and their 
interaction with one another. In doing so, effort is made to; (1) build a generic model of the 
dynamics of insurgency evolution (2) simulate insurgency and economic performance scenarios 
in terms of GDP growth and (3) test policies to mitigate insurgency. 
The entire thesis is organized in 7 chapters. Literatures about conflict transformation and system 
dynamics have been reviewed in Chapter 2. Problem definition and hypothesis described, and 
reference mode formulated in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, the model is explained. Model validation 
and the results are presented in Chapter 5. The discussion continues in Chapter 6 about possible 
scenarios. The study concludes and presents ideas for future research in Chapter 7. 
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an overview of the literature relevant to developing a model capturing 
interlinked cause and effect relationships of conflict. System dynamics approach has applied to 
examine causes and consequences of conflict in Nepal. 
2.2 System Dynamics Literature 
The idea of system dynamics modeling approach as a method of analyzing, modeling and 
simulating physical and social system, Jay Forrester and his colleagues have first proposed at the 
Massachusetts Institutes of Technology (MIT) in 1961. He has developed original ideas by 
applying concepts from feedback control theory, decision-making processes and experimental 
approach to study of industrial systems (Ford, 2010, Forrester, 1961). According to Forrester 
(1961) information feedback characteristics of industrial activities shows, how organizational 
structure changes (in policies) and time delay (in decisions and actions) interact to affect the 
success of the enterprise. Industrial dynamics provides ‘a single framework for integrating the 
functional areas of management- marketing, production, accounting, R&D, and capital 
investment’ (Forester, 1961:13). He further expanded the scope of system dynamics applying 
these ideas with his book Urban Dynamics in 1969. Urban dynamics explained the rapid 
population growth and subsequent decline seen in cities (Ford, 2010). Later the idea of Forrester 
has been used to capture the dynamic relationship of energy and the economic growth and the 
environmental implications and supply-chain management. Similarly, several scholars have used 
the ideas to analyze and model policies for nation building, software development, state stability, 
insurgency, and terrorism (Sterman, 2000; Richardson, 2004; Choucri et al. 2006; and Stroh, 2009). 
Recently many researchers have applied the system dynamics approach for understanding and 
analyzing conflict, insurgency, terrorism, and war and security. Crane (2009) has used system 
dynamics approaches to characterize the strengths and weakness of the Democratic Republic of 
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Congo- an African Country experienced a number of struggles and conflict. Richardson (2004) 
describes the viability of applying systems dynamics modeling techniques to simulate the 
establishment of public order and safety in a post-conflict reconstruction operation in Iraq. He 
has identified the number of dissatisfy person with the occupation, and the rates of restored 
critical infrastructures have the highest impact on how long it takes to establish security. 
In an article Choucri et al. (2006:3) argue that a ‘state is stable for the extent that its resilience 
(capabilities) is higher than the load (or pressures) exerted upon it.' They applied system 
dynamics model to understand the nature and dynamics of insurgency and core feature of state 
resilience (capacity) to withstand loads produced by the insurgency. Supinajaroen (2011) applied 
system dynamics approach to examining maritime sovereign disputes in the South China Sea 
(SCS) and potential benefit and cost of war for China. Gil et al. (2005) used a System Dynamics 
model to capture the causal relationships of terrorist activities of Middle Eastern groups against 
the United States based on their ideological drivers and the result of U.S. policies that create 
dynamics and affect performance and outcomes. 
Sokolowski and Banks (2007) used SD model to understand the nature of insurgencies and 
determine strategies for mitigating their effects. Their study used the system dynamics model to 
develop a population dynamics, mathematical representation of insurgencies and the factors that 
control the flow of people in and out of insurgency behavior. Similarly, Anderson (2007) 
demonstrates potentiality for using system dynamics in analyzing urban insurgencies. In another 
study, he used system dynamics model for the counterinsurgency strategy including the effects of 
intelligence, public security, popular support and insurgent experience (Anderson, 2011). 
2.3 Conflict Literature 
Adam Curle, one of the earliest Quaker conciliator- described stage of progression of conflict to 
peaceful resolution as; (1) Latent conflict and education, (2) Overt Conflict and Confrontation, 
(3) Negotiation and Sustainable Peace. Awareness on conflict increases through education, 
confrontation and negotiation. The balance of power and peace relationship increase in the later 
period (cited in Shakya, 2009). In Nepal, the popular movement (Jana Andolan) in 1990 brought 
significant changes in the political and social sphere as well as expands people’s expectation 
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from the regime. Political awareness, increased access to formal/non-formal education, and 
media brought much consciousness on people's lives. Scholars argued that the failure to meet 
people’s expectation generate room for Maoist insurgency in Nepal (Khadka, 1993).  
The Maoist insurgency did not happen and bloomed suddenly in 1996. It was the product of 
continuous ignorance of the need of the lower segments of Nepali society especially in difficult 
terrain of rural area along with weak governance, ineffective resistance to Maoist impact, and 
state failure in addressing issues of caste, ethnicity, and language. Similarly, government’s 
inability to resolve the political dispute within the jurisdiction of directive principles of the 
constitution is also the cause of the insurgency in Nepal (Marks, 2003; Letch, 2005).  
Initially, Maoist started opposing the regime with a small number of insurgents in the rural part 
of the country. In response, the government has launched counterinsurgency operation in the 
name of Operation Romeo and Kilo Sera II. During the operation, security force used excessive 
coercive acts (criminalized, imprisoned, tortured, humiliated innocent people) in the name of 
controlling insurgency. As a result, small movements swept across the country like wildfire. The 
suppression continued, and violence escalated from both warring sides. On the other hand, it 
raised many issues of pervasive structural violence (Shakya, 2009). In the negotiation stage, both 
conflicting parties realized need for compromise and cooperation that can lead to agreement for 
restructuring the relationship and increased justice. There were many peace talks and mediations 
in Nepal. First one had conducted in July 2001, second in March 2003; finally, the state and the 
Maoist signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in November 21, 2006. After the 
CPA, the election of Constitution Assembly has accomplished successfully in April 10, 2008. On 
the other hand, there is persistence of trauma, hatred, revenge, and continuation of violent armed 
groups in the society (Shakya, 2009). The hope of sustainable peace has threatened because of 
the dissolution of the CPA without delivering a new constitution to the country.  
In the context of Nepal, Burton's human needs theory could be, according to Shakya (2009), 
appropriate theory to examine major cause of armed conflict. These are social exclusion and 
disruption of human needs of identity (ethnic, cultural, religious, language), dignity, security, and 
the community (Shakya, 2009). However, Acharya (2009) found no evidence that political and 
economic grievances linked to the rate of political violence. He also found no evidence that 
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class, caste or ethnic grievances were at the root of the Maoist conflict. Rather, probably many of 
the villagers who joined the insurgency did so out of necessity associated with their safety (i.e. 
they would have a higher probability of killing if they did not join) or for personal economic 
reasons such as the desire for food, shelter and clothing. The intensity of violence was greatest in 
districts with low road density especially, in the Midwestern districts (Acharya, 2009). In 
particular, Fearon and Laitin (2003) claim that the relationship between poverty and civil war is 
strong due to weak state capability in poor countries. They also find that geographical conditions that 
favor insurgency play an important role in the incidence of civil wars (Cited in Do and Iyer, 2009).  
Two sets of theories- polarization and horizontal inequality- are equally important in explaining 
armed conflict (Rustad et al., 2011). Both theories analytically focused on groups and provided 
similar explanations of how social, economic and political exclusion causally related to armed 
conflict. Polarization occurs when two or several groups exhibit significant inter-group 
heterogeneity in combination with intra-group homogeneity (Esteban and Ray, 1999 cited in 
Rustad et al. 2011). Similarly, horizontal inequality explains group identities and group 
differences. It is more important than inequalities between individuals and such inequality 
typically rooted in a long history of discrimination (Stewart, 2000 cited on Rustad et al. 2011). 
Murshed (2009 cited in Rustad et al. 2011) highlights four forms of discrimination that can lead 
to horizontal inequality: (1) Discrimination in public spending, taxation and public employment; 
(2) high asset inequality; (3) differential impact of public policies (especially economic 
mismanagement); and (4) access and allocation of resource.  
Similarly, Collier et al. (2003) argue that the civil war impedes development, and equally 
development impedes war. Where development succeeds, countries become gradually safer from 
violent conflict that ensures subsequent development easier. On the other hand where 
development fails, countries are at high risk of falling into a conflict trap in which war destroys 
the economy and increase the risk of further war. They claim that some social, political, and 
economic characteristics systematically increase the incidence of civil war, and ethnicity and 
religion are much less important than commonly believed. By contrast, economic attributes 
matter more than has, usually, recognized. They conclude that the key cause of conflict is the 
failure of economic development. Once a country has tripped up into the conflict trap, which 
tend to lock it into a syndrome for further conflict (Collier et al. 2003). 
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2.4 Post-conflict Peace-building and Cost of Conflict 
Peace-building refers to “attempt to overcome the structural, relational and cultural 
contradictions which lie at the root of the conflict” (Mial et al. 1999:36 cited in Ismail, 2008). 
Peace-building involves the creation of a set of realistic goals, policies and strategies. It aims to 
prevent the occurrence of armed conflicts; to avoid direct violence; to establish a legitimate 
framework for all the stakeholders in participating peacefully in economic, social, and political 
life of the country. It is not only peace-keeping by military operation and enforcing peace but 
also rebuilding society disrupted by conflict. It is about creating peaceful means to settle disputes 
and conflicts (Dahal, 2010). The concept “peace-building” invented by famous Norwegian peace 
researcher Johan Galtung and popularized by former UN Secretary- General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali in 1992. The aim is to identify and support formations of peace in order to avoid a relapse 
into conflict and seek to stabilize the political situation (Dahal, 2010).  
Peace-building often related to Galtung’s tripartite approaches to peace – peacekeeping, 
peacemaking and peace-building. Peacekeeping refers to the action seeking to stop and reduce 
violence of the conflict through the intervention of military power. Peacemaking aimed at 
reconciling political and strategic approaches through mediation, negotiation, arbitration and 
reconciliation. Peace-building addressed the practical implementation of peaceful social change 
through socio-economic reconstruction and development (Ismail, 2008:12). Other peace theorists 
reinforce this view by linking contemporary peace-building to the distinction between structural 
and direct violence, and between negative and positive peace. Lederach’s Conflict 
Transformation Approach to peace-building emphasized the transformative goal of peace-
building. It focuses on opportunities for ‘creating constructive change processes that reduce 
violence, increase justice to direct communication and social structures, and response to real-life 
problems in social relationships’ (Ismail, 2008). Hence, the key tasks of peace-building could be 
the restoration of security, governance, development activities, humanitarian relief and 
reconciliation.  
There are at least five, according to Ismail (2008), component of post-conflict peace-building: 
(1) disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of insurgent to demilitarize society; 
(2) post-conflict reconstruction-rebuilding of physical infrastructure; (3) reconciliation (4) 
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humanitarian relief; and (5) social re-engineering (Ismail, 2008). Similarly, Dahal (2010) 
describes four main phases of peace-building as: (1) Immediate post-conflict intervention 
(ceasefire, the peace accord, election, human rights, humanitarian assistance); (2) Transactional 
peace-building (management of changed context, actors, issues and rules, security, life-
supporting measures); (3) Reconstructive peace-building (disarming, demobilizing and 
reintegrating combatants, security sector reform, support to people, rehabilitation, reconstruction 
and reconciliation); and (4) Transformative peace-building (addressing the causes of the conflict 
and satisfying the basic needs of the community in post-conflict societies).  
After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the major political parties and CPN 
(Maoist), in 2007, the UN Security Council has established United Nations Mission in Nepal 
(UNMIN) on the request of the CPN (Maoist) and the government. The aim is to support in 
monitoring of armed forces and arms, CA election and the peace process. Most of the donors in 
Nepal have now incorporated do no harm conflict sensitivity and peace-building components 
into their policy documents. So do the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, National Planning 
Commission of Nepal, line agencies, INGOs, NGOs and civic organizations. These efforts, 
however, lack coherence (Dahal, 2010).  
Conflicts are costly. It has estimated that the cost of each conflict, in general, almost equals the 
value of annual development aid worldwide (House of Commons Report, 2005). It has 
economic, social, psychological, and the spillover effect. Numbers of studies have been 
conducted for analyzing cost of armed conflict all over the world. Skons (2005) reviewed the 
most comprehensive study of Brown and Rosecrance (1999), Stewart and FitzGerald (2001), 
Collier and others (2003), Nordhaus (2002), Bennis and the IPS Iraq task force (2002). He 
described the cost dimensions of armed conflict as; (1) cost to the parties of the conflict and (2) 
cost to the outside parties. Cost to the parties of the conflict consists of military expenditure and 
military casualties during the conflict, military expenditure after conflict. Similarly, it also 
includes economic and social impact and civilian casualties during the conflict and economic and 
social impact and post-conflict reconstruction after conflict. Cost to the outside parties includes 
military expenditure in neighboring countries, refugees, humanitarian aid and aid for 
reconstruction during conflict. Similarly, outside parties must also bear international and regional 
peace operation and humanitarian aid and aid for reconstruction after conflict (Skons, 2005). 
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During the civil war, According to Collier et al., (2003) incomes are around 15 percent lower 
than they would be otherwise implying that more than 30 percent of the people live in absolute 
poverty. However, the end of a civil war does not end the costs resulting from it. Conflict 
undermines the economy and leaves a legacy of violence. During the civil war, a society diverts 
some of its resources from productive activities to destructive activities. It makes a double loss: 
the loss from what the resources were previously contributing and the loss from the damage that 
they now apply. Military expenditure crowded out productive investment, therefore, decreases 
growth not only during conflict, but after conflict because military expenditure does not return its 
former level. Infrastructure destruction is the most obvious cost of war, and more substantial cost 
arises from the fear of violence (Collier et al., 2003).  
Collier et al. (2003) investigate national, regional and global impact of civil war. Civil war 
increases the displacement, mortality, loss of social capital, capital flight and poverty within the 
country. Neighboring countries suffer civil war’s economic and social spillover effects, drugs 
production and transport as well as spread of HIV/AIDS. Moreover, international terrorism 
grows as the global effects of civil war. Ninety-five percent of hard drugs production occurs in 
countries with civil wars and major supply routes run through conflict territories. A more 
speculative possible global price of civil war is the current AIDS pandemic (Collier et al., 2003).  
According to Collier et al. (2003:17) that civilian casualty was about 10 percent at the beginning 
of the 20th century. By the 1990s, approximately 90 percent of the casualties resulting from 
armed conflict were civilian. During the civil war military expenditure, in an average, rises as a 
percentage of GDP from 2.8 to 5.0 percent and capital flight from such countries increase from 9 
percent of private wealth to 20 percent. Civil wars undermine the efficient use of resources that 
could have allocated to other areas such as education, public health to improve the education 
system and the mortality rate. Military personnel tends to have high rates of sexually transmitted 
diseases (STDs), including HIV. Psychological damage in war survivors is one of the long-term 
impacts in society because war survivors have lost family members, friends, livelihoods, and 
identity. Similarly, landmines planted during the war affect both economic activity and public 
health even after conflict.  
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Economic theory suggests that an increment in government or military spending can crowd out 
private investment and may lead to lower rates of economic growth. However, some argue that 
military spending can also lead to some positive effects on economic growth by increasing 
aggregate demand which results in increased output and employment. Most research on the 
subject finds that defense spending tends to have an adverse impact on economic growth, either 
directly or indirectly (Pradhan, 2009). Staines (2004) explained three phases of the economic 
cycle related to conflict: phase of economic deterioration, the phase of contraction and phase of 
economic recovery. He explored the dynamics of pre-1990 and post-1990 conflicts and found 
significant differences in duration and costs of conflict in these two periods. Length of the 
overall conflict cycle, he observed, was 15 years in pre-1990 conflict and 11 years in post-1990 
conflict. In pre-1990 conflicts, real GDP growth was 1.7% below average. For the conflict after 
1990; real GDP growth was 12.3% below average considerably more than earlier conflicts due to 
deeper economic contraction and worse condition on initial recovery period (Staines, 2004).  
Political tensions themselves could weaken various aspects of economic performance. Higher 
military spending may adversely affect economic growth in the long-run by two direct and 
interrelated ways. First, increases in military spending may diminish the total stock of resources 
that are available for alternative domestic uses such as investment in productive capital, 
education, and market-oriented technological innovation. Second, high spending on the military 
may aggravate distortions that decrease the efficiency of resource allocation, thereby lowering 
total factor productivity (Knight et al., 1996).  
Landau (1993) studied the impact of military spending on economic growth with the sample of 
71 countries. He found that the impact of military expenditure on growth is a combination of 
three effects as; (1) military expenditure increase security- positive impact on growth;  
(2) Military expenditure related to external threat develop pressure for efficient policies relating 
to security - positive result; and (3) diversion of resource from productive investment- negative 
result. These results will produce a non-linear relationship between military expenditure and 
growth. At low levels of military expenditure, there will be a positive impact on growth due to 
increased security and efficiency. While at higher levels it crowded out productive investment, 
therefore, create a negative impact on growth (Landau, 1993). 
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Chapter Three: Dynamic Problem and Hypothesis 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter presents an overview of the literature relevant to the dynamics of 
insurgency development and associated cost of the insurgency. The chapter also analyzes causes 
and consequences of conflict in Nepal. This chapter continues the discussion on dynamics of 
insurgency, dynamic problem, the causal mechanism of insurgency, the actor, strategies and 
feedback mechanism of insurgency. 
3.2. Dynamic Problem 
There were a number of armed conflicts erupted in Nepal aiming to change the political regime. 
Nepali Congress raised arms against Rana Regime in 1951 and Panchayat Regime in 1962; the 
Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist-Leninist) involved in a guerrilla war aiming to abolish 
kingship from Nepal in 1972. However, insurgency during 1996-2006 created by the Communist 
Party of Nepal (Maoist) in the name of ‘people’s war’ has been able to create higher attention to 
the world community and its impact also much larger in term of social, economic, and political 
cost of conflict. 
The popular movement in 1990 brought positive impact on economic activities in Nepal. Nepal 
was able to achieve above 5% growths due to policy reform by the elected government in 1990. 
However, due to insurgency started in 1996, growth began to decrease and reached negative in 
2002 for the first time in 19 years (Pradhan, 2009). During the conflict, both the Maoist and the 
Security force have increased sharply. The Maoist fighting force that began with few insurgent 
and weapons expanded to around 31 thousand (Shakya, 2009). Similarly, security personnel 
grew to about 157000 from some 35000 (the World Bank, 2010). The government security 
expenditure in 1996 was about 0.9 percent of GDP while it reached 2.5% of GDP in 2006. 
Security expenditure between 2000 and 2006 grew by over 300 percent (Pradhan, 2009). More 
than 16000 lives have lost, and more than 400,000 families internally displaced while thousand 
other cross over India (Upreti, 2006). The estimated cost of conflict- direct and indirect- 
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according to Upreti (2006) was the amount of 119.07 billion Nepalese Rupees in year 2001/02, 
and 2002/03 including Maoist Army expenditure. That stands about 12% of nominal GDP. 
Similarly, Pradhan (2009) estimated that the opportunity cost of the conflict in terms of lost 
output has been about 3 percent of Nepal’s current GDP. Besides, insurgency incidents made 
civil life difficult and forced donation and shelter to Maoist, especially in rural areas, further 
deteriorate their economic life. Insurgency also creates an adverse situation to the tourism sector 
one of an important source of foreign exchange and employment in Nepal. Economic growth 
during the conflict reached negative and still struggling to revive.  
The problem of insurgency is very complex in term of actors’ involvement; elements cause it and 
its impacts and cost. The impact of conflict cannot be limited to the parties involved in the 
conflict, but to those who do not have any direct relationship with the conflict. As discussed in 
Chapter two, armed conflict creates cost, not only for the country or countries in conflict but also 
for neighboring countries and international communities. Similarly, conflict creates costs not 
only during conflict, but also after conflict. Skons (2005) stated that the ‘costs after the end of 
violence are often as high as the costs during conflict.' Insurgency has a feedback structure where 
elements within the system produce and receive feedback. It has dynamic properties i.e. the 
system changes and reacts to changes in its elements. Therefore, system dynamics modeling 
approach can better serve the objectives set forth in this research. Because system changes 
constantly, then the study of statistical correlation between variables as other studies applied. A 
model competent of capturing the dynamics involved in the conflict would be helpful in giving 
insight to decision makers about what policies should follow.  
Besides, according to Gil et al. (2005), a dynamic modeling approach based on accepted theory 
about factors directly motivate its behavior and other exogenous (external) factors. The approach 
would result in a more appropriate vehicle for policy analysis than relying on statistical 
regression analysis of historical data or doubtful estimations. The overall goal of this thesis is to 
develop SD model to gain insight into the dynamic behavior of insurgency and its potential cost. 
It could be achieved by constructing a general model for simulating the initial establishment of 
security. Then by applying the general model to a notional scenario to determine which system 
parameters might have most affected the outcome of the insurgency in Nepal. 
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3.3. Conceptual Causal Mechanism of Insurgency in Nepal 
As mentioned earlier, the fundamental proposition of this study is that the insurgency can be 
characterized as a system within which all behavior is generated related to the insurgency. 
Insurgency viewed as an armed contest between the state and counter-state for political control 
of the subject of population and its associated resources (Letch, 2005). Actors, their activities, 
resources, strategies and feedback structure need to conceptualize while modeling the insurgency 
dynamism. The development of this model based on the reading of literature and reviewing what 
the authors felt significant for analyzing the dynamic behavior of insurgency in Nepal. The 
model primarily based on Dr. Gordon McCormick’s Counterinsurgency Model also known as 
diamond model and methods that have adopted by other researchers such as Dr. Edward G. 
Anderson, Dr. John A. Sokolowski, Damon B. Richardson, Nathan A. Minami, Nazli Choucri 
and other. McCormick’s Counterinsurgency model provides a useful starting point to frame this 
conceptual mechanism. 
 
Figure 3.1: McCormick Counterinsurgency Model. Source: Canonico (2004) 
The counterinsurgency model (see figure 3.1) demonstrates how both state and counter-state 
apply strategies, resources, and principles to achieve success. Letch, (2005) explains both 
insurgent and counterinsurgent as a part of the system set a target against the backdrop of 
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geopolitical, social, economic and cultural conditions that describe resources, constraints and 
opportunities for political control of the target group. He argues that Insurgents and 
counterinsurgents represent system convert inputs (e.g. people, money, material, and 
information) into outputs (i.e. government programs, military operations, rewards) using their 
available infrastructure (e.g. government-rebel administration, training, logistics). Input may 
come from national or international community. Therefore, both insurgent and counterinsurgent 
rely on people for information and affects people with its output. 
The model depicts actors (section 3.3.1), strategies (section 3.3.2) and feedback mechanism 
(section 3.3.3) for those forces. The upper half of the model explains internal environment of the 
host nation and lower half explain external environment. The overall strategy (internal to the 
state) identifies the populace as the center of gravity. The state and counter state agent pursue the 
strategy of gaining support from the international community (Canonico, 2004; Letch, 2005). 
3.3.1 The Actors  
Counterinsurgency model in figure 3.1 shows four types of actors have played direct or indirect 
role in insurgency dynamics: the Security Force, the Insurgent Force, the Population and the 
International Community. 
The security force is the state forces include police, military, intelligence infrastructure and trainer. 
In Nepal, during insurgency Nepal Army, Armed Police Force, Nepal Police and Intelligence 
department mobilized in the name of joint security operation. According to Canonico (2004), the 
security force must integrate all element of national power such as civil, military, diplomatic, 
informational, economic and financial. They must clearly identify the legitimate target among 
insurgent that can often hide in the local populace while conventional security force can easily 
identify by their standard uniforms, base and vehicles. Similarly, distinguishing voluntary 
insurgent and coercive support of insurgent is the most difficult obstacle to the SF. 
The insurgents are those either actively or passively supporting insurgent movement including 
active fighters, supporters, infrastructure. Maoist insurgent in Nepal grouped into hardcore 
Maoist fighter, militia members, active political cadres, and active supporters (Letch, 2005). 
Sometimes many organizations may involve in an insurgency. For example during Cuban 
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Revolution there were multiple organizations working to remove Batista from the power 
(Canonico, 2004). 
The population is in the center of gravity in the model; both state and counter state pursue their 
activity for gaining popular support. Population should be considered neutral to insurgency 
consists of non-combatants in the country. Coercive supporter may not consider insurgent until 
they give clear support to the insurgent. Both state and counter state rely on people for their 
strength. Population support or oppose state or counter agent by providing information. 
However, people may not be considered pro-insurgent or pro-government until they provide 
information above or below the base level (Canonico, 2004). 
International community consists of external states, international organizations and other groups 
working in direct or indirect support role. They remain neutral until they provide support to one 
or another side; once they provide support becomes part of insurgent force or security force. The 
aim of this study is not to analyze international influence on the Maoist insurgency, so external 
factors excluded from the model. 
3.3.2 The Strategies 
McCormick’s counterinsurgency model explains both insurgent and counterinsurgent apply five 
basic strategies during insurgency: three relating to the internal environment and two related to 
the external environment. These strategies are:  (1) gain control and support of people; (2) 
identify and dismantle the infrastructure of the enemy; (3) defeat the opponent through direct 
actions; (4) disrupt opponent relations with the international community; and (5) establish a 
relationship with the international community (Canonico, 2004; Letch, 2005). His model is 
simple and powerful, but certain aspects must be examined in more detail if the model is to be 
applied to the situation in Nepal.  
The population neutralizes the strength and weakness between security force and insurgent force 
(Canonico, 2004). They heavily rely on popular support during insurgency. Loudly voiced 
slogans and strategies during the insurgency in Nepal such as ‘by, with, and through the people’ 
or ‘hearts and minds,’ refer to the importance of winning popular support in an insurgency or 
counterinsurgency. However, these mantras sound logical but offer little practical advice to 
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address the issue (Letch, 2005). It is hard to measure why and when it matter, what people think 
and who must care more about people than enemy. During the insurgency many innocent person 
killed/tortured in the name of the spy by both forces do not support their popular slogan. These 
issues are critical to understanding insurgent and counterinsurgent systems in active conflict. 
Moreover, help to explain why McCormick argues that the logical sequence of the strategies 
begins with gaining widespread public support and ends with attacks on the enemy (Letch, 2005). 
Both insurgent and counterinsurgent fulfill various needs through popular support. Although 
security force is strong in resources, personnel and training, they usually lack intelligence on 
insurgent. Therefore, security force needs intelligence to identify legitimate target, calibrate and 
control insurgent without innocent casualties because innocent casualties will degrade the public 
support. Similarly, Insurgents need public support to increase resources, employees and place for 
hiding. Insurgents are attempting to diminish the government’s legitimacy through attacks, 
propaganda, demonstrating inability to provide security to the people and the other way of control 
(Canonico, 2004).  
Population during insurgency is under extreme pressure from both sides because each side wants 
the people to act in a manner favorable to them. Contrary to their expectation they might exact 
brutal revenge to village informants and their family if discovered. Hence, such support is the 
primary input to the growth and operational capacity of each side. Next they pursue the strategy 
of identifying and destroying opponent’s infrastructure. If they succeed in this strategy, in 
addition to material effect, they might be able to limit the production of output hope to further 
impact on populace preferences. Finally, each party targeted the output of other in other to score 
direct physical or psychological damage to the opponent (Letch, 2005).  
Most of the insurgency/counterinsurgency becomes battles for legitimacy and strong 
international support. During the insurgency, both sides pursue their strategy of disrupting 
opponent’ international relation and establish their strong relationship so as to enhance their 
legitimacy. They also seek material, financial, weapons, training and other logistic supports from 
the international community along with verbal support (Canonico, 2004). The more they rely on 
internal resources, the more burden of proof rest on the population that converts their 
dissatisfaction toward them. 
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3.3.3 The Feedbacks 
Feedback is critical for understanding the effects of insurgent and counterinsurgent’s action on 
people and international perceptions (Canonico, 2004). These perceptions are the basic 
information to the conflicting parties for their further actions. The feedback connections allow 
forces to assess both the success and failure of their operations. Feedback mechanism allows the 
researcher to understand the dynamism of insurgency/counterinsurgency, how input converts 
into outputs and back again inputs. 
3.4. Causal Loop Diagram 
As discussed earlier, the insurgency depends on the population dynamics including loops about 
state capacity, public opinion, violent acts by insurgent and counter-actions by security forces. 
The characteristics of insurgency in Nepal bear similar issues. The model by Anderson (2006), 
Sokolowski and Banks (2007), William (2009) and Minami and Kucik (2009) have provided the 
closest proximity to what is occurring in Nepal. This section will briefly present the causal 
mechanisms behind the various dynamic factors active in the insurgency in Nepal as well as 
describing some possible behaviors. The causal loop diagram is a method of explaining the 
relationship between variables. Arrows connect all variables with the polarity. The plus (+) sign 
indicates the changes (increase or decrease) in one variable leads to changes in another variable 
in the same direction. The minus (-) sign indicates the opposite change between the variables. 
The time delay in the system is denoted by (≠) sign. 
3.4.1. Incident Suppression and Insurgent Creation  
The Maoist has expressed strong disagreement with the Constitution of Kingdom of Nepal 1990. 
However, the Maoist participated in the first parliamentary election after 1990 using its open 
forum ‘Joint Peoples Front’ and won nine seats in the parliament. Later the strong fraction of the 
Maoist party boycotted the second election and declared war against the regime. In 1996, the 
Maoist formally declared war with the regime by attacking police post in rural districts (Rolpa 
and Rukum). In response, the government launched Operation Romeo and Kilo Sera II to 
suppress the insurgency. These counterinsurgency operations interrupt civil life. As a result, 
19 
 
people dissatisfied with the government and turned into support to the insurgent. A small 
movement swept across the country like wildfire. The point of departure of the model is about 
insurgent incident and insurgent creation mechanism in the system shown in figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2: Incident suppression and insurgent creation loops 
Incident suppression loop shows that an increase in the number of Maoist insurgent will result in 
an increase the number of incidents. With increased incidents, the populace becomes upset and 
shouts for the government to do something to stop the incidents. As a result, the government will 
use force to suppress the insurgency. The more suppressive action by security forces will capture 
or kill the insurgents, therefore, reduce the number of insurgent and incident. This loop tends to 
balance the number of insurgents. SF suppressive actions have determined by the number of 
security force mobilized (denoted as security force mobilized) and suppressive actions per 
soldier. It is a balancing loop (marked by ‘B’ in the diagram) because higher insurgent at a point 
of time will finally reduce their number at another point of time. Short delay exists between 
pressure to reduce incidents and actions by security forces, because of time needed to implement 
suppressive policies.  
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However, the security force suppressive actions are not free of cost. The constant interference of 
security forces in the daily lives of the people leading to dissatisfaction toward the government 
that turned into support to the insurgent. It may stimulate more people to join the insurgency; 
therefore, increase in a number of insurgents leads more violent incident and more pressure to 
reduce incidents. This pressure will cause higher suppressive action and further interference in 
civil life and completed the loop by the increasing number of insurgent still more. The behavior 
of insurgent development described in the figure 3.2 shows when recruitment is greater than 
attrition the stock of insurgent increases and vice versa. The dynamism of this loop can best 
explain why initial small Maoist movement started in small rural areas, spread all over the 
country in a short time and able to control two third of the area. It is reinforcing marked by ‘R’ in 
the diagram. Reinforcing loops, according to Anderson (2006), typically are the engine of growth 
in system dynamics. Reinforcing loops work on both directions, also create a vicious cycle. 
3.4.2. War Weariness and Growth of Security Force  
Incident suppression and insurgent creation loop in Figure 3.2 cannot perfectly describe how 
insurgency uprising ultimately ends. Figure 3.3 adds a security force growth loop and a war-
weariness loop to the model.  
The conflict in Nepal has been on-going for a number of years. As discussed before, even before 
Maoist insurgency there were a number of political changes experienced (see also Annex II). The 
popular movement in 1990 reestablished multi-party democracy in the country supposed to 
establish long-term peace and stability in the country. However, due to failure of delivering the 
promise by the political parties create space for further conflict in the name of Maoist 
insurgency. Long political instability in the country resulted in a loss of populace confidence in 
the government’s ability to provide basic services and security to them. As violent incidents 
increases, civil society, human right activists criticize the government and create pressure on the 
government for a peaceful solution of the conflict. It creates pressure on the government to pull 
security forces back from the operation so as to create an environment for dialogue. The war 
weariness loop is balancing because populace continues to be tired of the insurgent activity, 
therefore, create pressure to increase the dialogue rather than use of more force. According to 
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Anderson (2006) this loop seems to come into effect only once the insurgent creation loop has 
begun to dominate the model. 
 
Figure 3.3: War weariness and security force growth loops 
Further, adding Armed Forced Growth loop in the structure, is also balancing loop, could 
determine how much security forces required for suppressive actions. Both pressure and war 
weariness messages come from the populace influence the policy of usage and growth of security 
forces. With increased pressure, the government needs to deploy more security forces for 
effective security actions to reduce violent incidents. This loop tends to create pressure on the 
government to recruit more security forces so as to deploy them into counterinsurgency activity. 
This loop, of course, helps to reduce the number of insurgents either through arrest or killing but 
also increases misuse of power and disturb civil lives that feed into the insurgent creation loop. 
Additionally, insurgent propaganda message will also increase dissatisfaction with the 
government because people can see how government soldiers entertain them. 
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3.4.3. Fundraising Effect, Resource Replacement, and Insurgent Depletion  
Four loops-fundraising, weapon and resource replacement and fundraising effect and insurgent 
depletion- further added in the structure shown in figure 3.4. Fundraising loop describes weapon 
stockpiles and source of finance of the insurgent. Fundraising effect and Insurgent depletion 
loops describe how people's satisfaction changes with fundraising activities and insurgent 
incidents. The more the insurgents rely on the internal source for their required resources, the 
more its effect on populace satisfaction that influences insurgent recruitment.  
 
Figure 3.4: Fundraising Effect, Resource replacement and Insurgent Depletion loops 
Weapon and resource replacement loops explain security force suppressive actions decrease the 
resource availability to the insurgent as well as insurgent incidents. Ultimately, if there are no 
funds to replace weapons, the number of incidents reduced to zero and the insurgency will 
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become dormant. To avoid this, the insurgent will ideally acquire either fund from external or 
internal sources. This fundraising activity refills the stock of resources and, therefore, 
reestablishes the insurgent capacity to create insurgent incidents (Anderson, 2006). Internal 
sources include donation, levy from member and supporter, looting government bank, charges to 
business in the territory under their control. External sources include donations from supporters 
living outside country, support from political allies from abroad especially communist 
organizations. Internal fundraising activities mainly include extortion and other unpopular means 
of coercion. It may erode them popular support, therefore, moderate recruitment and hamper the 
ability of active insurgents to evade capture by hiding among sympathetic populaces. 
In the Fund Raising Loop shown in figure 3.4, insurgents use both external and internal resource 
to support their material needs and funding. This loop is balancing because higher internal 
support increases their stock of the weapon and other resources that result in less internal fund 
needed in the future. However, as discussed earlier, internal fundraising involve coercive 
activities by the Maoist insurgent, which affects popular support to insurgent and their 
recruitments represented in fundraising effect loop. In the weapon replacement loop, government 
forces’ suppressive activities reduce the number of weapons available to the insurgents and their 
ability to conduct incidents. The ability of committing incidents depends on insurgent number 
and which largely depends on the peoples' support. 
3.4.4. Potential Insurgent and Economic Impact 
The final three loops added in the structure are potential insurgent, state capacity decline and 
state capacity revive loops. Figure 3.5 shows the result of population dynamics and 
unemployment upon the model. Population age 15-49 is a major source of insurgent. Perhaps, if 
the population growth rate declines or unemployment drops, the number of young persons who 
are physically capable of participating in an insurgency will decrease and vice versa. In Nepal, 
according to the National Survey 2001, 23 million people live in the county; of which 53 percent 
are between age 15 and 59. Regarding unemployment, the World Bank data shows employment 
to population ratio during the insurgency time varies 81 to 85 percent. Therefore, 15 to 19 
percentage of the population are unemployed. Similarly, according to Nepal Labor Force Survey, 
30 percent of economically active population is underutilized (unemployed or underemployed). 
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Figure 3.5: Potential insurgent and economic impact loops 
Both insurgent and security force activity obviously have an adverse effect on the economy. The 
Maoist mainly involves strikes, blockades, direct attacks, and destroy infrastructure. Similarly, 
security force committed in search of public and private transportation, house searching, limiting 
the movement of people, and counterattacks. During the insurgency in Nepal, these actions and 
counteractions are common and have an adverse effect on the economy. The economic 
performance contributes in strengthening or weakening the capacity of state along with other 
variables. According to Choucri et al. (2006) that the regime resilience (capability) can militate 
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against insurgent recruitment, therefore, reduce insurgent incidents as well as the adverse effect 
on the economy. If the economy is doing well or if the regime perceived as having increased 
legitimacy, there is less likelihood of individual become an insurgent shown in state capacity 
revive loop. The key determinants of state capacity as indicated in the social science literature 
are economic performance, legitimacy, political capacity and social capacity (Choucri et al. 
2006). The equation below represents the aggregate state capacity as; 
State Capacity   = αt*βt*γt*δt*εt*ωt 
Polity index:   αt = Polityt/Polity1996 
Civil liberties index:  βt  = Civil libertiest/Civil liberties1996 
GDP Index:   γt  = (GDPt/Population t)/ (GDP1996/Population1996) 
Employment Index: δt  = Employment per Capitat/ Employment per Capita1996 
Literacy Index: εt  = Literacyt/ Literacy1996 
Governance Index: ωt = Governancet/governance1996 
State capacity related with the economic performance of the county. Sound economic activity 
improve state capacity and will initiate to reduce potential stock of insurgent and actual 
insurgent. Consequently, violent incident and their intensity drop which create less pressure on 
the government to reduce incidents. The state can able to invest resources into productive 
investment that lead further economic growth. This loop is reinforcing and creates long-term 
impact on the insurgency management. If this loop generates the vicious cycle, the country may 
fall into conflict trap i.e. conflict undermine growth by different way and lower growth increases 
risk of further conflict. Polity index, civil liberties index, employment index, literacy index and 
the governance index are used as exogenous variable and GDP index as endogenous variable in 
the model. The time series data derived from different sources used to calculate the indices in 
this study. 
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Chapter Four: Methodology 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter will describe the system dynamics modeling approach, model boundary, selection 
of variables, rate of change and flows, stock and flow diagram and data used for this research. 
4.2. System Dynamics Modeling Approach 
‘System dynamics is a methodology for studying and managing complex system that change 
over time’ (Ford, 2010:7 cited on Winz et al., 2008). ‘It is an approach for modeling and 
simulating complex physical and social systems and experimenting with the models to design 
policies for management and change’ (Choucri et al. 2006). Especially, computer modeling used 
to focus on information feedback loops that give rise to the dynamic behavior and to understand 
the impact of time delays and non-linearity in the system. System dynamics allows the researcher 
to analyze complex system from a cause-and-effect perspective, rather than from a statistical 
standpoint. It provides flexibility to the researcher to utilize both conceptual understand as well 
as empirical data collection (Gil et al. 2005; Choucri et al. 2006). System dynamics model offers 
unique abilities to contribute to social science, economics, or political science modes of study 
(Choucri et al. 2006).  
Dynamic simulation enables to observe the behavior of the system and its response over time. It 
consists of equations describing dynamic change. Behavior of the state at one point of time, if 
known, the behavior of the state at another period can be computed (Winz et al., 2008). Unlike 
statistical modeling in which equations developed following observation and compared the 
output with historical data; system dynamics models are causal mathematical model comprised 
of the structure of the system that gives rise to its observable and predictable behavior (Forrester, 
1961, Sterman 2000 and Barlas 1996 cited on Winz et al. 2008). In system dynamics modeling, 
researcher needs to determine system structure consisting relationships between variables, 
feedback, system archetypes and delays. The understanding system structure requires a focus on 
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the system as a whole rather than a part of it. It is necessary to understand the system as a whole 
to manage complex system in real life situation (Sterman, 2000).  
System Dynamics Modeling consists of qualitative and quantitative modeling methods (Dolado 
1992 cited in Winz et al. 2008). Causal loop diagrams improve one's conceptual or qualitative 
inquiry and stock and flow diagram explain the structure and behavior of the system applying 
mathematical equations. Quantitative modeling using stock and flow diagram allows 
investigating and examining the effect of various interventions through simulation. It also 
requires conceptual understanding and assumptions be underlying the model (Winz et al. 2008). 
The system dynamics comprised of problem definition, system conceptualization/hypothesis, 
model formulation, model evaluation/testing, policy analysis and implementation (Sterman 
2000). The purpose of this study as mentioned earlier is to understand and analyze dynamism of 
Maoist insurgency in Nepal and estimate underlying cost to the country. System Dynamics 
Modeling Approach could be useful methodological choice to understand the nature and 
behavior of insurgency and its overall cost to the society and country as a whole. 
4.3. The Model Boundary 
Structure and environment of insurgency is very complex because there are a number of actors 
involved, a number of elements cause it, and multi-dimensional result it produces. There may be 
a huge number of variables in the system. It is hard to incorporate all such variable in the model 
due to time and resource constraints; therefore, it is imperative to describe the consideration 
about model structure and environment. The primary concern of this research is to describe 
insurgency dynamism and its cost to the society and nation as a whole. However, number of 
possible elements could not be analyzed and left for further study. The model boundary designed 
in this study will help to explain model structure and its environment. It also ensures modeling 
process is in the right track. It also helps people to understand the scope of the model.  
Table below shows model boundary in this model. Variables used in the model classified as 
Endogenous, Exogenous and Excluded. Endogenous column explains dynamic variables 
involved in the feedback loop. Exogenous explains for components whose values are not directly 
affected by the system, and excluded column shows the relation that this model does not consider 
due to some reason. 
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Table 4.1: Variables Used in the Model 
Endogenous Exogenous Excluded 
Increasing rate of insurgent Security Force normal growth rate Annual cost of insurgency 
Additional SF increasing rate SF expenditure Total cost of insurgency 
Insurgent incidents Base population  
SF actions SF parameter, suppressive 
parameter, satisfaction parameter 
and other parameter 
Cost of insurgency % of 
GDP 
Indicated insurgents Time delay of various element in 
the system 
 
Change in Satisfaction GDP normal growth fraction  
Potential economic effect Social capacity, political capacity 
and governance 
 
State capacity   
Insurgent weapons and 
resources 
  
4.4. Selection of Variable 
In system dynamics modeling, it is necessary to determine model structure, which is critical. It 
needed to generate a model that creates the problem, and it must contain “all the interacting 
relationships needed to lead the system into trouble” (Forrester, 1969:113 cited in Richardson, 
2004). If modular fail to build a model with all interacting relationships, internal process of the 
system lead in a different direction (Forrester, 1969 cited in Richardson, 2004). So the selection 
of variables is an important aspect of system dynamics modeling that can represent different 
aspects of the state of the system.  
This study selected 11 level variables with the purpose they describe the insurgency dynamism 
and the cost of insurgency collectively. These variables classified in four basic categories: (1) 
insurgent and security force activity, (2) public satisfaction, (3) effect of insurgency on the 
economy, and (4) cost of the insurgency. 
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4.4.1 Insurgent and Security Force Activity 
Insurgent and security force activity sector describe their activities, strategies, support and 
growth over time. In the insurgency situation, both security forces and insurgents involve 
different activities so as to gain superiority over other. State activities during insurgency include 
patrolling, house searching, intelligence, civil affair, capturing and elimination, neutralization, 
creating a favorable environment for development and population resettlement. According to 
Letch (2005), the elements of counterinsurgency system in Nepal are security forces including 
village self-defense force, intelligence resources, and national and village level officials. Three 
distinct state security forces-the Royal Nepal Army (now renamed Nepal Army), the Armed 
Police Force and the Nepal Police- deployed in the counterinsurgency operation during the 
insurgency from 1996 to 2006. In the beginning, the government deployed Nepal Police to 
combat insurgency. Later in 2001, the government declared a state of emergency and authorized 
the RNA to enter the conflict and engage offensively to combat insurgency (Letch, 2005).  
Exogenous support received mainly from China, India, UK, and USA. It includes mainly capital 
investment and development, medicine and physical infrastructure, military equipment, weapons, 
night vision helicopters, secure communications spare parts and training to RNA. However, 
when the King takes over all political rights in 2005; the international communities reacts the 
step and virtually all military and development aid suspended or placed under review since 
February 2005 (Letch, 2005). Letch (2005) argued that Nepal’s fundamental limitations are 
political unity, security, intelligence and resources during insurgency.  
The Maoist activities mainly include building strength, harassment, intimidation, strikes, and 
collection of resources; evacuate police station and government offices from the rural area. They 
also involved in attacking security force base camp, collection of money by using coercive 
means, looting bank and other government agencies, terrorizing people and forced to join and 
support Maoist. They use three instruments to achieve their goals: the party, the People’s Army, 
and the United Front. The uniformed People’s army and the non-uniformed village militias are a 
major strength of Maoist during insurgency (Letch, 2005; Upreti, 2010; Marks, 2003). It is hard 
to determine the exact number of Maoist insurgent due to the poor state intelligence. There is 
lacking unanimously saying about their number. However, some tentative guesses are available. 
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For example, Letch (2005) argues that there were 5000 to 10,000 hardcore Maoist fighter; 
10,000 to 15,000 militia members; 15,000 to 25,000 active political cadres; and 100,000 to 
150,000 active supporters. However, After the CPA between the major political parties and CPN 
(Maoist), the UN Security Council has established United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) 
registered 32500 Maoist combatants. Later after verification the number reduced to 19602 
(Himalayan times daily).  
The Maoist foresees three strategic phases: strategic defensive, strategic stalemate and strategic 
offensive. Strategic defensive is the period of growth used to build forces, political control in a 
remote village. It aimed at target attack against unarmed civilians, robberies and extortion of 
food and money. Activities during this phase designed to strengthen forces and resources. In 
strategic stalemate phase, the Maoist concentrates on direct attack against weak elements of the 
security forces and creates psychological pressure on the public. They concentrate on to secure 
their hold on the area of their influence; impose their education text, courts and security. The 
Maoist on one hand, enter cease-fire agreements and on the other use the time to re-arm of forces 
and gain public support. In the strategic offensive phase, they focused to take control of 
remaining countryside and increase pressure on the economy and people of the urban area 
(Letch, 2005). According to Letch (2005) that the Maoist insurgents enjoy intelligence 
advantages at the operational and strategic level.  
Although there are three types of security forces: the RNA, the Armed Police Force and the Civil 
Police engaged to combat insurgency. However, for simplicity of the model no separate level 
variable designed for all security forces. Two level variables designed to represent all three 
security forces: (1) the number of SF at normal, taking constant growth fraction based on 
historical data before insurgency start, and (2) the number of additional security force required. 
Insurgents mapped with one level variable: (1) the number of active Maoist Insurgent. 
4.4.2 Public Satisfaction 
The Maoist insurgency did not happen and bloomed suddenly in 1996. It was the product of 
continuous ignorance of necessity of the lower segments of Nepali society, weak governance, 
and the state failure in addressing issues of caste, ethnicity, and language. Democratic 
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government’s inability to resolve the political dispute within the jurisdiction of directive 
principles of the constitution also create nurturing environment for insurgency in the country 
(Marks, 2003; Letch, 2005).  
Public satisfaction is an important level variable in this model that explains how insurgency 
blows up. The government chose very coercive approach to combat the insurgency at the initial 
stage instead of dialogue and negotiation. Romeo, Kilo Shera-2 and Jungle Search are major 
military operation launched in 1998-1999. In addition, the government launched Silent Kilo 
Shera-3, Delta and Chakrabyuha Operation in 2001 to combat insurgency (Upreti, 2010). These 
coercive operations become counterproductive to the government because of higher casualty of 
innocent people. Principally, insurgent incident activate pressure to reduce incident and war 
weariness with shorter and longer delay respectively over the time. It is the reason government 
chooses coercive actions against Maoist initially, but later the government realizes that popular 
support matter during counterinsurgency operation and launched Internal Security and 
Development Programme (Upreti, 2010). Therefore, there was no conflict between Maoist and 
security force at that time. Insurgent incidents also have influences on the level of satisfaction 
with the Maoist over time.  
This variable measures support or oppose to insurgent and security force. Dissatisfaction with the 
government favors insurgent and dissatisfaction with insurgent favors security force. Public 
satisfaction represents two level variables: public satisfaction with the government and public 
satisfaction with the insurgent. These variables varied with the activities of both the security 
force and insurgents. These variables assume to act as a proxy for the perceived legitimacy of the 
government because the development of legitimate government is essential to the creation of 
sustainable security (Richardson, 2004). 
4.4.3 Impact of Insurgency on Economy 
Insurgency has economic, social, psychological, and spillover effect. Effect of insurgency may 
not come immediately but is unavoidable if insurgency starts. Insurgency adversely affects 
economic activities and reduces income and leaves a legacy of violence. Increased military 
expenditure crowded out productive investment and reduced the growth that may not return its 
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original level even after conflict. Displacement, mortality, loss of social capital, capital flight, 
and poverty are common effects of civil war. Psychological damage in war survivors is one of 
the long-term impacts in society because war survivors have lost family members, friends, 
livelihoods, and identity (Collier et al., 2003).  
However, the purpose of this study is to examine the impact of insurgency on the economy, so 
the effort paid to estimate loss of economic performance due to insurgency. Gross Domestic 
Product at insurgency compared with the GDP at hypothetical normal situation. Three level 
variables designed to measure economic result of the insurgency: (1) level of economic effect of 
insurgency, (2) the amount of GDP at normal, and (3) the amount of GDP at insurgency. The 
amount of military and insurgent activity is the measure of potential economic effect. Normal 
GDP growth fraction estimated based on the historical data and GDP at insurgency was the 
function of economic effect of insurgency and normal growth fraction. The effect of the 
economy to insurgency dynamics was also assumed. A strong economy enhances government 
role along with political, social, military, governance capacity which favor SF operation and vice 
versa. 
4.4.4 Cost of Insurgency 
The Maoist insurgency, as discussed earlier, has been able to achieve significant changes 
positive or negative in the country. It has established federalism by abolishing 240 year old 
institution- the monarchy and remarkable awareness in the populace, but is not free of cost. More 
than 16000 lives lost thousands of the government building and infrastructure destroyed billions 
of rupees spent on insurgency and counterinsurgency operations, and billions of rupees spent on 
managing insurgent after conflict. Cost of armed conflict to the internal parties can be, according 
to Skons (2005) personal, security, economic, social, human rights and sovereignty. Similarly 
cost of the insurgency can also be grouped into direct cost, indirect cost and hidden cost 
(Supinajaroen, 2011). Direct cost is the cost that directly used during and after insurgency 
measured in four categories: (1) the amount of additional security force expenditure, (2) the 
amount of Maoist insurgent expenditure, (3) the amount of Maoist voluntary retirement cost, (4) 
the amount of Maoist cantonment cost, and (5) the amount of after war cost. 
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Indirect cost is the cost related to insurgency and counterinsurgency operation also known as the 
opportunity cost. It is the effect of insurgency on the economy. The amount of loss of GDP 
represents indirect cost of the insurgency comes from the effect of insurgency on economy 
sector. Hidden cost used in insurgency and counterinsurgency operation but is needed after 
insurgency has finished. In reality, this cost relates veteran Medicare or social welfare 
(Supinajaroen, 2011). The level value after the insurgency cost represents this cost. Inflow to this 
value comes from additional security force expenditure and integration cost of insurgent. The 
lifetime of this cost assumed as 30 years based on age of soldier and life expectancy. Three level 
variables designed to determine the cost of the insurgency as after war cost, cantonment cost and 
total cost of the insurgency. 
4.5. Rates of Change or Flows 
The level variables described in the previous section capture the state of insurgency dynamism 
and its environment, but by themselves do not develop over time. The rates of change or flows 
describe how those level values evolve over time. The model developed in this research is a 
network of interconnected level variable and rate of change or flow. Each level variable has one 
or more rate of change associated it. These flows determine how level value changes over time 
and together they determine how the entire system evolves over time. Table 4.2 lists each of 
level value and associated flows in the model and the Figure 4.1 presents stock and flow 
structure of general insurgency dynamics and cost of insurgency model. The direction of changes 
indicated by the sign + or – indicating an increase or decreasing in the level value over time. 
Table 4.2 and figure 4.1 present level variable and associated rate of change of insurgent and 
security force activity, public satisfaction, impact of insurgency on the economy and cost of the 
insurgency. Insurgents classified into active insurgent. Active insurgents are the person actively 
involved in insurgency activity. This stock increases with ‘insurgent recruitment rate’ and reduce 
with ‘insurgent attrition rate’ and ‘insurgent retirement rate’ over time. The unemployed people 
are the main source of insurgent recruitment and affect the level of public satisfaction with the 
state and Insurgents. Population assumed as exogenous variable increasing at the constant rate of 
growth over time. 
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Table 4.2: Level Values and Associated flows 
Level value Direction of change Flows 
 
Active Maoist Insurgent 
+ Insurgent recruitment rate 
- Insurgent attrition rate 
- Insurgent retirement rate 
Security Force normal + SF normal growth rate 
Additional Security Force + Additional SF increasing rate 
Public Satisfaction with the 
Government 
+ Chg in satisfaction with the 
government 
Public Satisfaction with the Maoist + Chg in satisfaction with the Maoist 
Normal GDP + Normal GDP growth rate 
GDP at Insurgency + GDP at insurgency growth rate 
Economic Effect of Insurgency + Insurgency effect increase rate 
Cantonment Cost + Cantonment cost growth rate 
 
After Insurgency Cost 
+ After Insurgency cost growth rate 
- After Insurgency cost decrease 
rate 
Total Cost of Insurgency + Total cost growth rate 
 Figure 4.1: General Overview of Insurgency Dynamics and Cost of Insurgency Model 
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Nepal Army, Armed Police Force and Nepal Police were engaged in a counterinsurgency 
operation. For the simplicity of the model, all elements of security forces combined into one 
named Security Force. It is assumed that recruitment in security force is not constraint because 
the government can easily recruit as much as required from about 30% un/underemployed people 
(National Labor Force Survey, 2001). It was found that a large number of the applicant applied 
for a job in security force when vacancy announced. Security force increases by a constant 
growth rate based on historical data and additional force required with demand generated by the 
intensity of the insurgency. 
The level value ‘Public Satisfaction with the Government’ measures the level of satisfaction 
with the state. The level of satisfaction varies from '0' to '1', one being satisfaction and zero being 
the dissatisfaction. The level of satisfaction varies with change in satisfaction determined by the 
effect of security force suppressive action on populace. 
The level value ‘Public Satisfaction with the Maoist Insurgent’ measures the level of 
satisfaction with the Maoist. The level varies from '0' to '1'. The level of satisfaction varies by the 
change in satisfaction that is the function of insurgent resources and their activities. The more 
they collected required resources from the internal sources; the lower will be the level of public 
satisfaction toward them. Similarly, insurgent activities interrupt civil life that turned into 
dissatisfaction with the Maoist. This level has influences on their recruitment capability.  
The level value ‘Normal GDP’ and ‘GDP at insurgency’ is the measure of economic 
performance. The difference will be the loss/benefit of GDP due to insurgency. The flow to the 
normal GDP assumed as a constant growth rate based on historical data. The rate of change in 
GDP at insurgency varies over time with the effect of intensity of the insurgency. GDP index is 
the proxy measure of economic performance which share state capacity along with the other 
external variable as governance, social capacity and political capacity.  
The level value ‘Economic Effect of Insurgency’ is the measure of to what extent insurgent 
incidents and suppressive actions by the security force affect the economic activity in the 
country. This effect determines effective GDP fraction during insurgency and compared with the 
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normal GDP fraction.  As discussed earlier, Collier et al. (2003) observed that while the civil war 
incomes are around 15 percent lower than otherwise would have been in normal condition.  
The level value ‘Cantonment Cost’ measures the management cost of insurgent including 
monthly allowances of insurgent in cantonment or camps under the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) signed in November, 2006. The integration process of People’s Liberation 
Army into Nepal Army started thereafter. There were 32500 combatants in cantonment at the 
beginning. After the verification, UNMIN, qualified 19602 combatants and kept in cantonment. 
They were paid 3000 rupees monthly allowance in the beginning, and later the amount increased 
to 6000 Nepalese rupees. A total of 1460 ex-combatants formally join Nepal Army and those 
uninterested in joining Army get voluntary retirement with a lump sum amount of 500,000 to 
800,000 depending on the rank. The integration chapter finally concluded in Dec. 2012. 
Altogether in management of combatant and cantonment, the government spent 20 billion rupees 
from Nov, 2006 to July, 2012 (Himalayan Times Daily and Karobar daily, 11 Aug. 2013).  
The level value ‘After Insurgency Cost’ measures the social welfare of insurgency victims and 
ex-soldiers. Inflow to this value is after insurgency cost growth rate and is a function of 
additional security force expenditure and insurgent integration cost. The lifetime of this cost is 
set around 30 years.  
The level value ‘Total Cost of Insurgency’ shows overall cost of the insurgency that the 
country suffers. The rate of change 'total cost growth rate' is the function of all direct, indirect 
and hidden cost variables. 
4.6. Stock and Flow Diagram 
Figure 4.1 describes the overall structure and environment of the Maoist insurgency and cost of 
conflict in Nepal. To make the model simple and understandable, it has divided into four sub-
models. These sub-models are (1) insurgent and SF activity sub-model, (2) public satisfaction 
sub-model, (3) economic effect of insurgency sub-model, and (4) cost of insurgency sub-model. 
In the following four sections, the flows associated with each of the level values or stocks 
explained. The level values shaded by blue color; the variables that affect another sector marked 
by green color and the shadow variables represent the variable coming from other sectors. 
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4.6.1 Insurgent and Security Force Activity Sub-model 
This sub-model is developed so as to capture the interaction among the insurgent, the security 
forces and the population. Figure 4.2 presents the structure of the insurgent and security force 
activity and insurgent resources, its development over time showing associated rates of changes.  
Figure 4.2: Insurgent and Security Force Activity Sub-model 
One level variable identified to represent the number of insurgents; two level variables designed 
to represent the number of security forces, and one level variable designed to represent the 
amount of insurgent resources. All of the level variables have a different influence on other rate 
and variables in the model. There are three types of security institutions in Nepal as Nepal Army, 
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Armed Police Force and Nepal Police. All these forces jointly mobilized in the operation during 
insurgency. So none of separate level variable searched for representing them separately; rather 
attempt has made to differentiate security force growth at hypothetical normal period and 
additional security force growth due to additional demand for combating insurgency. The reason 
behind this formulation is to estimate the additional cost incurred due to insurgency.  
Level values have been changed by the corresponding rate of change, other level values and 
other variable in the system. Rectangular boxes represent level values; solid arrows represent 
flows and arrows represent link between level values, flows and variables (parametric inputs). 
Value of the stock determined by the equation as Stockt= Stockt-dt + Inflowdt-Outflowdt 
Active Maoist Insurgent represents the institution of insurgent. The size of insurgent institution 
depends on insurgent recruitment rate, insurgent attrition rate (killed or captured) and insurgent 
retirement rate. Recruitment of insurgent materialized from the population stock dissatisfied with 
the regime. Attrition of insurgent rate depends on the intensity of insurgent incidents and 
suppressive actions by security force. The rate of change of Active Maoist insurgent defined by 
the following equations; 
Insurgent Recruitment Rate = IF THEN ELSE (Time<end of insurgency time, MAX 
((Indicated Insurgents-Active Maoist Insurgent)/time to join insurgency,0)*insurgent 
creation loop switch, 0) 
This equation drives the annual number of active insurgents to what their indicated level should 
be based on public satisfaction with both the state and the Maoist. 
Insurgent Attrition Rate= Insurgent Incidents*fractional attrition rate per incident + 
Attrition rate from suppression.  
This equation measures annual number of insurgent attrition. Insurgent Attrition Rate is the sum 
total of attrition from suppression and fractional attrition rate*insurgent incidents.  Suppressive 
acts by SF represent their effort to capture, demobilize, neutralized or killed the insurgent 
through suppressive actions. These actions depend on the number of security force deployed in 
the operation, resource available and maximum use (capacity of SF). Insurgent incidents 
represent the insurgency activities by the Maoist insurgent. Number of active Maoist, weapon 
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and resource availability and capability of individual insurgents are the variables that determine 
the number of insurgent incidents. 
Active Insurgent Retirement Rate= Active Maoist Insurgent/Avg Insurgents Career in Years 
This equation measures the regular retirement of insurgent. Average insurgent career in years is 
estimated 12 years. 
Security Force Normal and Additional Security Force represent two level values; Security 
Force Normal and Additional Security Force and its growth over time determined by two rate of 
change. Although there are three institutions of SF in Nepal, but for the purpose of this study, 
only two stocks designed to represent all security forces. The inflow assumed at normal situation, 
and necessity arises to recruit additional security personnel due to insurgency. SF also recruited 
from the stock of the eligible population. The corresponding inflows of the level values defined 
by the equations as; 
SF Normal Growth Rate = Security Force Normal*SF normal growth fraction 
SF Normal Growth Rate initiated by exogenous growth fraction estimated based on the 
historical data. As discussed earlier, political changes in 1990 established multi-party democracy 
in the country brought various internal security challenges due to increased mass mobilization by 
the political parties. A small number with less equipped security forces could not able to manage 
frequent strikes, political mobilization and criminal activities efficiently. Not only Maoist 
insurgency, but also other factors influence in increasing the number of security force. Fixed 
growth fraction is taken based on the historical data that initiate SF growth rate at normal. 
Additional SF Increasing Rate =   (Desired Security Force-Security Force 
Total)/adjustment time for desired security force. 
Additional SF Increasing Rate represents growth of the number of security force due to 
insurgency and depends on the development of desired security force. Desired security force 
represents the expected security force necessary for effective suppressive actions and influenced 
by pressure to reduce incident and war weariness. Both war weariness and pressure to reduce 
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violent incident are due to insurgent incidents. Short time delay activates pressure to reduce 
incidents and longtime delay needs to be wearied about insurgency. 
Insurgent Incident and SF Suppressive Actions measure the activity of both insurgents and 
security force in the model. Insurgent incidents are mainly insurgent’s activities including 
building strength, harassment, intimidation, strikes, collection of resources, evacuate police 
station and government offices from the rural area. These incidents pressurize the government to 
take actions against them because civil society, business sector, and general public demand more 
security. However with the long delay, war weariness will also emerge due to negative effects of 
war. These two influences generated by the insurgent incidents determine how much SF needs to 
be deployed in suppressive actions. Security force suppressive actions include patrolling, house 
searching, intelligence, civil affair, capturing and elimination, neutralization, creating an 
environment for development and population resettlement. Both insurgents and security force 
activities are determined by their strength in number, soldier capacity, and resource availability. 
These activities have an effect on public satisfaction, which is the important source of 
information to both of them, and also influences on economy and cost of the insurgency. 
Maoist Weapons and Resources measure fundraising activities and its impact on public 
satisfaction with the Maoist. The corresponding inflow and outflow of the level values expressed 
as the following equations as; 
Weapon and Resource Growth Rate= IF THEN ELSE (Desired Insurgent Weapon and 
Resources>Maoist Weapon and Resource, (Desired Insurgent Weapon and Resources-
Maoist Weapon and Resource)/time to fulfill desired resource, 0) 
This equation measures the insurgent’s weapons and resource acquisition activities. Maoist uses 
both internal and external source for their necessary financial and material resources. It is hard to 
estimate their fund requirement and collection from internal and external sources. However, 
some predictions are available. According to Letch (2005) Maoist funding comes mainly through 
a mix of coercive and criminal activities such as 40% extortion from individuals and businesses; 
20% looting and bank robbery; 25% illegal trade in narcotics; and 15% external sources 
(primarily Nepali Diasporas in India and the U.S.). The number of insurgent strength and 
minimum substantial amount per person could be the proxy of their requirement of fund denoted 
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by the variable desired insurgent weapons and resources. Insurgent weapon and resource per 
person including insurgent army accessories, food, clothing, shelter and weapons were estimated 
by taking consideration of Nepal's per capita income, availability of low wages laborer, and their 
voluntariness against the state. 
Weapon and Resource Loss Rate= IF THEN ELSE (Time<=end of insurgency time, 
(Maoist Weapon and Resource/weapon and resource depletion time) + (Maoist Weapon 
and Resource*Eff of suppressive action on Insurgent Resources), 0) 
This equation measures the loss rate of weapon and resources. The stock of resources depletes at 
a normal rate plus loss from suppressive actions by the security force during insurgency. 
Corresponding influences of Insurgent weapons and resources assumed in this study as the 
impact on Maoist ability to create incidents and effect on the public support to them. 
4.6.2 Public Satisfaction Sub-model 
 
Figure 4.3: Public Satisfaction Sub-model 
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Public Satisfaction with the Government is an important level value in this model. This level 
influences the rest of the model in two ways. Satisfied people with the state provide information 
to the security force that supports the effectiveness of suppressive actions while dissatisfied 
people facilitates insurgent recruitment. The public satisfaction rate of change denoted by the 
equation as; 
Chg in Satisfaction with the Government= (Indicated Public Satisfaction with the Gov-
Public Satisfaction with the Government)\IF THEN ELSE (Indicated Public Satisfaction with 
the Gov>Public Satisfaction with the Government, time to satisfy, time to dissatisfy) 
This measures how quickly public satisfaction with government changes. Note that the time for 
satisfaction and dissatisfaction is different. 
Public Satisfaction with the Maoist Insurgent measures how insurgent incidents and their 
resource collection efforts affect public satisfaction with them. Insurgent activities and means of 
fund collection determine the level of public satisfaction toward them. The Maoist, as discussed 
earlier, heavily relies on the internal source of funding. The more they rely on internal sources 
especially from donation from the general public, the higher the people dissatisfied with them. 
This level variable affects insurgent recruitment rate. The public satisfaction rate of change with 
the Maoist expressed by the equations as; 
Chg in Satisfaction with Insurgent = (Indicated satisfaction with the Maoist-public 
Satisfaction with the Maoist Insurgent)/IF THEN ELSE (Indicated satisfaction with the 
Maoist>public Satisfaction with the Maoist Insurgent, time to satisfy, time to dissatisfy) 
Indicated satisfaction with the Maoist =MIN (XIDZ (1, (Effect of Insurgent Incidents on 
population + effect of internal source on population), 1) ^satisfaction parameter, 1) 
4.6.3 Impact of Insurgency on Economy Sub-model 
This sector shows the result of the insurgency that is unavoidable if insurgency happens. Three 
level values have taken to measure the impact of insurgency on the economy such as Economic 
Effect of insurgency, GDP at Normal Situation and GDP at Insurgency shown in figure 4.4. 
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Figure 4.4: Impact of Insurgency on Economy Sub-model 
Economic Effect of Insurgency is a key indicator represents the sensitivity of economy to the 
insurgency. The potential economic effect compared with this level value in order to determine 
the rate of change of this value with the adjustment time of three years. 
Economic Effect Increase Rate=Gap of Economic Effect/time to adjust gap of economic 
effect 
Potential economic effect= (1-XIDZ (1, "relative Insurgent/SF activity"*(1/State 
Capacity), 1) ^economic effect parameter)*economic effect switch 
Potential economic effect depends on relative insurgent/SF activity, and it is a function of 
insurgent incident and security force suppressive actions. Both insurgent incidents and security 
force suppressive action have taken to determine the relative value of such actions.  
Normal GDP and GDP at Insurgency show the development of economic indicator in two 
dimensions. The stock Normal GDP grows in a constant growth rate based on the historical data 
whereas GDP at insurgency rely on the intensity of the insurgency hence slower than a normal 
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situation. The rate of change of these two stocks is compared to see the loss of GDP at 
insurgency over time. 
4.6.4 Cost of Insurgency Sub-model 
Previous section explains the dynamics of the insurgency and its effect on the economy, this 
section presents all cost associated with insurgency presented in Figure 4.5.  
 
Figure 4.5: Cost of Insurgency Sub-model 
Cost of insurgency grouped into three categories: direct cost, indirect cost and hidden cost. 
Direct cost is the sum of the amount of additional SF expenditure, the amount of Maoist 
insurgent expenditure, the amount of Maoist voluntary retirement cost, and the amount of Maoist 
cantonment cost. Indirect cost is the effect of insurgency consequences on the economy. The 
amount of loss of GDP represents indirect cost of the insurgency comes from the effect of 
insurgency on economy sector. Hidden cost is not a part of insurgency and counterinsurgency 
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operation but is necessary after insurgency has finished. In reality, this cost relates veteran 
Medicare or social welfare (Supinajaroen, 2011). The level value after the insurgency cost 
represents this cost. Inflow to this value comes from additional SF expenditure and integration 
cost of insurgent. The lifetime of this cost assumed as 30 years based on age of soldier and life 
expectancy. Three level variables designed to determine the cost of the insurgency as after war 
cost, cantonment cost and total cost of the insurgency. 
4.7. Data Used 
Historical data are an important element of system dynamics modeling. Historical data support 
the model to be justified and reasonable. Information used in this model comes from many 
sources of references. For example, the initial number of insurgent was estimated on the basis of 
previous research and the UNMIN report used to estimate the total number of insurgent. 
Historical information of Military expenditure and number of armed force personnel was taken 
from the database of SIPRI. Similarly, nominal and real GDP and other economic data were 
taken as a reference from World Bank data and statistics and Economic Survey of Nepal. 
Website of Nepal Army, Armed Police Force, Nepal Police and other government websites and 
online newspapers are other important sources of information. All the data collected as primary 
information process and interpreted into required monetary and other terms. Various model 
validation processes have been conducted to make sure that the model is not much sensitive on 
the unsure variables. 
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Chapter Five: Dynamic Behavior and Sensitivity Analysis 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction  
The fundamental premise of this study, as discussed earlier, is that the insurgency characterized 
as a system within which all behavior related to an insurgency generated. Structure of the system 
developed in the previous section describes level variables, rate of change, other variables and 
parameter built in the system. The efforts have made to discuss how these variables behave and 
how they interact to other variable. Similarly, model validation and sensitivity analysis will also 
be conducted so as to establish confidence about the usefulness of the model. 
5.2 Dynamic Behavior 
Structure of insurgency dynamic discussed in the previous chapter composed of the number of 
stocks or level variables, flows or rate of change, variables and parameter. Each variable 
generates behavior affect other variables, and other variables affect it, as well. Insurgency as a 
system has feedback structure where elements in the system produce and receive feedback and 
the system responds to changes in its elements. Development in the level values over time shows 
the system elements influenced by other elements in the system. The dynamic behavior of the 
system compared with the reference mode taken from the available historical data and 
assumptions. The parameters have adjusted accordingly that the simulated behavior could best fit 
with the reference mode. 
5.3 Validation of the Model 
According to Sterman (2000) ‘valid implies being supported by objective truth’ and by this 
definition ‘no model can be verified or validated'. Theories or models are falsifiable and had to 
be possible to falsify it by experiment (Sterman, 2000:847). However, the reliability of any 
model can be enhanced by the process of validation that is the primary consideration of people to 
justify each design. “Validation is the process of establishing confidence in the soundness and 
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usefulness of a model”(Forrester and Senge 1980 cited on Supinajaroen, 2011). It is crucial to 
verify and validate the model before simulating different scenarios and making decisions about it 
(Campuzano and Mula, 2011). The main purpose of validation is to increase justifiable 
confidence in the model. Justifiable confidence based on the evidence that the model 
performance replicates the reference mode; structure causes its performance, and equations are 
internally consistent. Similarly, decision rules represent the real-world situation; parameters 
estimation is sufficient for the intended purpose; and documentation is sufficient for third party 
replication. 
Sterman (2000) described the most significant test to verify the model such as boundary 
adequacy, structural assessment test, dimensional consistency test, parameter assessment test, 
extreme condition test, error integration test. Similarly, he also described behavior reproduction 
test, sensitivity analysis test, behavior anomaly test, family member test, surprise behavior test, 
sensitivity analysis and system improvement test. However, it is hard for this research due to 
time and resource constraint that the model would pass through all these tests. In this study 
behavior reproduction test, boundary adequacy test, dimension consistency test, direct extreme 
condition test, structure-behavior test, the integration error, and sensitivity analysis were applied. 
The test of model structure will test the whole model together. However, the test of the model 
starts with each sector separately, emphasis given to test Insurgent and Security Force Activity 
sector. It is the main sector of this system. Meanwhile, the other three sectors; Public 
Satisfaction, Effect of Insurgency on Economy and Cost of Insurgency tested, as well. 
5.3.1. Behavior Reproduction Test 
Behavior reproduction is the effort to see how fit the model to simulate with the historical data or 
reference behavior shown in figure 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4. The figures compare the simulated 
behavior and historical data. The blue line represents a dynamic behavior of historical data, and 
red line represents simulated behavior.  
The historical data relating to the number of security force, gross domestic product, and military 
expenditure were taken from World Bank statistics, SIPRI and economic survey of the ministry 
of finance and other related government websites. Nevertheless, it is difficult to identify the 
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exact number of Maoist Insurgent. For the purpose of this study, the number of Maoist 
insurgents is based on other scholar’s estimation and verification by UNMIN after end of the 
insurgency. The expected result of the model simulation is to replicate the reference mode in 
term of quality and quantity. The purpose of this study is to develop a generic model which can 
describe the behavior of insurgency. So the behavior fitting in term of quality is acceptable. 
 
Figure 5.1: Base Run-Active Moist    Figure 5.2: Base Run-Security Force Total 
 
Figure 5.3: Base Run- GDP at Insurgency   Figure 5. 4: Base Run- GDP Growth Rate 
5.3.2. Boundary Adequacy Test 
This test assesses the appropriateness of the model boundary for the purpose of modeling. 
According to Sterman (2000) that modeler should use the model boundary chart, subsystem 
diagram, causal diagram, stock and flow diagram and direct inspection of the model equation to 
satisfy the adequacy of the model. Similarly expert opinion, interviews, archival material, and 
review of the literature should also be used to assess boundary adequacy of the model. 
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This test is a frame of modeling during the whole study. The model boundary chart shown in 
table 4.1 describes endogenous variables, exogenous and excluded variables in the model. The 
causal loop and stock and flow diagrams in Chapter Three and Four respectively describe model 
boundary in this study. Model equations checked thoroughly for exogenous input to confirm the 
list of exogenous variables. In this model, total cost of the insurgency excluded from the 
feedback the result of insurgency and counterinsurgency on economy and vice versa is designed 
in the model. Therefore, the feedback of the total cost of the insurgency excluded to avoid double 
count the result of the insurgency on economy. 
5.3.3. Dimension Consistency Test 
The dimension consistency tested directly by the software using to build and simulated for this 
study. In the case of logical equation to which software did not trace unit consistency, the effort 
paid to inspect equations one by one so as to build up confidence about unit consistency. 
Therefore, the model tested of the unit consistent. 
5.3.4. Structure and Parameter Assessment 
All of the structures based on the situation mentioned in the real world relevant to the design of 
the study. Focus has been paid not to violate physical realities. Causal diagram, stock and flow 
diagram and direct inspection of the model equation enhance confidence that the structure of the 
model in this study reveals the real life situation. The technique of modeling in the previous 
chapters is reasonable for this study, and the reader should evaluate the rest. 
In the parameter assessment, this is a weak point of this model in term of parameter estimation. 
There are a number of parameters in this model such as time to join the insurgency, time to 
satisfy, time to dissatisfy, time to create pressure, attrition parameter, and maximum suppressive 
act that are inaccessible. Furthermore, some are different depending on the source mentioned. 
The parameters, however, estimated on the basis of past research work, reports and time series 
data and started conceptually to the realistic. Furthermore, sensitivity test results show that very 
few of them are sensitive to the performance of the model. The use of these parameters still 
keeps the model on track of study purposes, which is building a generic model independent to the 
parameter. 
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5.3.5. Direct Extreme Condition Test 
The purpose of this test is to see how the system responds in some extreme condition. This test 
carried out by direct inspection of model equations and simulation so as to build confidence 
whether the model is robust in extreme condition. The parameters adjusted accordingly and 
simulated the model to satisfied robustness under extreme conditions. 
Insurgent Parameter = 0 and 5 
Insurgent parameter measures the power that modifies the effect of public satisfaction with the 
government and effect of public satisfaction with the insurgent on insurgent recruitment as 
shown in the figure 5.5 and 5.6. 
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Figure 5.6: Annual Cost of Insurgency and Total Cost of Insurgency when Insurgent Parameter=0 and 5 
 
Figure 5.5: Active Moist and Security force Total when Insurgent Parameter=0 and 5      
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Satisfaction parameter = 0 and 1 
Satisfaction parameter measures sensitivity of peoples’ perception about coercive acts by the 
security forces and the Maoist. It should be set to less than one to ensure diminishing returns to 
coercive acts. 
 
 
 
 
Public satisfaction is the key variable of insurgency dynamism and depends on the number of 
coercive acts of the conflicting actors. Dissatisfaction with an actor turned into support to 
another and vice versa. 
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Figure 5.7: Public Satisfaction with Government and Maoist Insurgent if Satisfaction Parameter = 0 and 1 
Figure 5.8: Active Maoist and Security Force Total if Satisfaction Parameter = 0 and 1 
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Economic effect parameter =0 and 1 
This parameter measures the sensitivity of the economic sector toward insurgency dynamics. The 
higher the value of this parameter leads to greater effect on the economy, therefore, lower the 
GDP and increase the cost of the insurgency. Similarly, weak performance of the economy has 
weakened state capacity to deal with the insurgency effectively in relation to attrition and 
recruitment. The figures below show the behavior while taking different value of this parameter. 
 
 
Max suppressive acts = 0 and 1 
This parameter is a limit on how many coercive acts a soldier could commit per year. The higher 
suppressive acts per soldier aim to reduce the number of insurgent, however, this also causes 
dissatisfaction with the government and leads to further growth of insurgent number as shown in 
the figure 5.10 and 5.11. 
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Figure 5.9: GDP at Insurgency and Annual Cost of Insurgency when Economic Effect Parameter = -0 and 1 
 
Figure 5.10: Maoist Insurgent and Security Force Total when Max Suppressive Acts = 0 and 1 
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Time to join insurgency =0.1 and 2 year 
This parameter measures the time taken to recruit potential insurgent as a full time insurgent. The 
figure below shows the higher time taken in the recruitment will slow down insurgency 
dynamism in the system. 
  
Figure 5.12: Maoist Insurgent and Security Force Total if Time to Join Insurgency = 0.1 and 2 year 
Average insurgent career in years =1 and 20 
Average insurgent career in years is the number of years an insurgent will be active assuming 
that he has not been captured.  
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Figure 5.11: GDP at Insurgency and Annual Cost of Insurgency when Max Suppressive Acts = 0 and 1 
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Figure 5.13: Maoist Insurgent and Security Force Total when Average Insurgent Career in Year = 1 and 20 
Incidents per insurgent =0.01, 1 and 2 
This parameter measures a limit on how many insurgent incidents an insurgent could commit per 
year. Insurgent incidents measure the degree of public satisfaction toward insurgent and pressure 
to reduce such incident for security forces. Higher insurgent incidents, on one hand, reduce 
public support toward the insurgent which affects their recruitment; on the other create pressure 
to use more security force. The insurgents could be in a favorable situation only when security 
forces committed greater coercive acts. Use of more or less coercive acts slows down their 
growth, but faster growth in opponent side as shown in the figure 5.14. 
 
Figure 5.14: Maoist Insurgent and Security Force Total if Incidents per Insurgent= 0.01, 1 and 2 
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Both parties try to commit coercive acts in such a way not to diminish public support. There is a 
risk of losing public support in committing more coercive acts and risk of being arrested or 
controlled by an opponent in case of committing fewer actions. 
Time to create pressure =0.1 and 10 year 
Time to create pressure is the scaling factor for the result of incidents on pressure on the 
government. Short time to recognize pressure speeds up insurgency/counterinsurgency actions.  
That further deepens the insurgency dynamism because both parties could commit more violent 
actions.  
 
Figure 5.15: Maoist Insurgent and Security Force Total if time to create pressure = 0.1, and 10 years 
 
Time to weary of insurgency =0.1 and 10 year 
Time to weary of insurgency measures the desire of the government to pull back of security 
forces from the operation and try to settle disputes in a peaceful manner due to weariness with 
the insurgency. The higher the populace worries about the war, the fewer security forces they 
have to maintain in the operation. 
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Figure 5.16: Maoist Insurgent and Security Force Total if time to weary of insurgency = 0.1 and 10 years 
Time to satisfy = 1 and 5 years 
This measure how long the public need to satisfy.  
  
Figure 5.17: Maoist Insurgent and public Satisfaction with the Government if time to satisfy = 1 and 5 years 
The figure above shows there is not much difference in satisfaction in initial stage, but difference 
can be seen at later stage.  
Time to dissatisfy =0.5 and 5 years 
This is the time needed to upset people. Longer time to upset people affects insurgent 
recruitment, therefore, slow down the insurgency activity. 
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Figure 5.18: Maoist Insurgent and public Satisfaction with the Government if time to dissatisfy = 0.5 and 5 years 
5.3.6. Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity analysis is a key step in the modeling process, especially when the model contains 
highly uncertain parameter (Ford, 2010). This test aims to ensure that the uncertainty in many 
parameters does not make much difference in the result. In this study numerical and behavior 
sensitivity analysis conducted to see whether the function variables used in the model are 
sensitive for the model. 
Effect of war Weariness and Pressure to Reduce Incidents on Desired SF:  The graph lookup 
function tested by changing the behavior. The normal use (base run) is an exponential decay for 
the effect of war weariness and exponential growth for the effect of pressure to reduce incidents 
on desired security force. For the test, the graph lookup changed in the s-shape pattern as shown 
below in the figure. 
 
Figure 5.19: graph lookup: - effect of war weariness and Pressure to reduce incidents exponential pattern 
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Figure 5.20: graph lookup: - effect of war weariness and pressure to reduce incidents s-shape pattern 
The result of the simulation in the Figure below shows that there is not much difference between 
simulations. Therefore, the model is not sensitive to the graphical function. 
 
Figure 5.21: Active Maoist and Security force taking exponential and S-shape graphical function 
Adjustment Time Sensitivity: For this test, adjustment time of variables such as time to weary 
of insurgency, time to create pressure, time to satisfy, time to dissatisfy, average insurgent 
career, time to join the insurgency, suppression response time, adjustment time of economic 
effect, weapon and resource depletion time set by the range of ±50% and ±100%. The figure 
below presents the results of sensitivity analysis. 
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Figure 5.22: Time sensitivity: Active Maoist and Security force Total 
 
Figure 5.23: Time sensitivity: Annual Cost and GDP at Insurgency 
The simulation result shows that the change of these variables does change the model behavior in 
some instant. 
Parameter Sensitivity: The value of the parameter such as the attrition parameter, SF resource 
parameter, insurgent parameter, satisfaction parameter, economic effect parameter, suppressive 
parameter, maximum suppressive acts, and reference incidents set by ±50% and ±100%. The 
result of parameter sensitivity has shown below in the figure. 
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Figure 5.24: Parameter sensitivity: Maoist Insurgent and Security Force Total 
War Weariness Sensitivity: For this test, time taken to be worried about insurgency is set by 
±50% and ±100% to see a change in the behavior of the model variable. The result below shows 
that time to be perceived the negativity of insurgency has significant influence on the behavior. 
   
Figure 5.25: War weariness sensitivity: Maoist Insurgent and Security Force Total 
Pressure to Reduce Incidents Sensitivity: Time to perceive pressure to reduce insurgent 
incident set by ±50% and ±100%. The result below shows sensitivity of model behavior while 
changing the assumption about the time taken to recognize pressure. 
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Figure 5.26: Pressure to Reduce Incidents sensitivity: Maoist Insurgent and Security Force Total 
Satisfaction Parameter Sensitivity: Satisfaction parameter is an important determinant of 
people’s satisfaction toward the government and insurgent. This parameter set by ±50% and 
±100% to see a change in model behavior. The result below shows that change in the assumption 
of this parameter has significance impact on the change in model behavior. 
    
Figure 5.27: Satisfaction Parameter sensitivity: Maoist Insurgent and Security Force Total 
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5.3.7. Integration Error 
The time step using in the model should be suitable for the model. For the base run simulation 
the time step has taken as 0.0625 year. In this test, the time step tested by cutting down for half 
of the initial then simulate the model to see whether the behavior of the model change or not. If 
the time step used is suitable for the model, the behavior should not be distinct from the base run. 
By this testing process, the used time step is 0.03125 year and then changes the time step to 
0.125. The model still keeps the same behavior as started. Therefore, the time step using is 
suitable, and the model is not sensitive to time step. 
  
Figure 5.28: Integration Error: Maoist Insurgent and Security Force Total 
5.4 Summary  
The structure and behavior of the model tested by a number of methods and the corresponding 
results presented in this chapter. For the scenario, further test will be conducted in the next 
chapter. Nevertheless, in this chapter, not all tests can be done but the study chose the tests, 
which make satisfaction of the model structure and behavior within the frame of study and design 
purpose. The model passed all the tests applied. The model behavior is sensitive to some of the 
parameters and not sensitive to some other parameters. Some parameters compensate other 
parameter value to generate particular behavior of the model. By these results, therefore, it can 
be concluded that the model is acceptable for this study. 
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Chapter Six: Scenario and Discussion 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In Chapter Five, a number of model validation tests have conducted so as to enhance reliability 
of any model. It is important to verify and validate the model before simulating different 
scenarios and making policy suggestions about it. The general form of the model and relevant 
structure used as tools of simulation and demonstrated how the general model can be used to 
investigate insurgency dynamics and associated costs of insurgency. 
In this Chapter, the model developed and tested will be used to simulating the base case and 
introduce alternative assumption about different scenarios. Assumptions in different scenarios 
will be further tested and analyzed before suggesting possible alternative strategies as treatments 
to the insurgency management. This chapter aims to derive the basis for policy or strategy 
suggestion for a better insurgency management. 
Base run scenario explains structure, strategy and variable responsible for what happened in the 
past during insurgency. This scenario is designed to capture the possible impact of the actors’ 
actions, the people’s perception, the economy, and the costs in the insurgency dynamics. The 
simulation result is compared with the reference data. The considerations are based on insurgent 
incidents and security force counter actions. 
Scenario one, if the impact of the economy on insurgent and security force activity is assumed 
not to influence the insurgency dynamics what will be happening to intensity of the insurgency 
and its cost. 
Scenario two, if the population is considered as static and taken as exogenous input of the 
population of 1996 then what difference does it make for the insurgency dynamics and the cost. 
Scenario three, if the public satisfaction is not considered as part of the system or if actors’ 
activities do not affect the level of public satisfaction and still is in the same level as before,  
what would happen in the insurgency dynamics and cost of conflict.  
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Scenario four, if insurgent and security force have unlimited resource capacity to involve in the 
conflict i.e. if resource constraint does not have any influence on insurgent and security force 
activity then how would the system (insurgency dynamics) develops behavior and its associated 
cost over time. 
Scenario five, if the incident suppression loop is switched off and considered no offensive 
actions by the security forces, then how would the insurgency dynamics reacts and changes in 
the cost of the insurgency. In this situation, how the system should prevent the state from being 
captured by the opponent. 
Scenario six, if the insurgent creation loop is switched off and there is no insurgent recruitment 
during insurgency, what could be the intensity of conflict and its cost. 
Scenario seven, if the war weariness is switched off and is not considered as part of the system, 
how would insurgency dynamics evolve and generate its cost over time. Similarly, if the time to 
weary of insurgency varied what different it produce in the insurgency dynamics and its 
associated cost. 
Scenario eight, the hidden cost of conflict is considered to calculate after the insurgency cost. 
The hidden cost added to this scenario shows how the cost of conflict grows in the long run.  
6.2 Scenarios 
6.2.1 Base scenario: Reference Mode 
The base scenario presents the insurgency dynamics and its associated cost which runs under the 
hypothesis of lack of understanding of insurgency development and mitigation has contributed to 
the cost of the conflict. The model structure developed in Chapter four is used to simulate the 
dynamic behavior of insurgency. The simulated behavior is compared with reference data 
presented in section 5.3.1 so as to build confidence about structure, variable and parameter 
responsible for generating such behavior. This section shows additional result of the simulation 
relating to the base scenario. Strategies or policies suggested in this research are based on a 
comparison with the base scenario. The annual cost of insurgency and total cost of insurgency in 
the base scenario is presented in figure 6.1. 
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Figure 6.1: Base Scenario: - Annual Cost of Insurgency and Total Cost of Insurgency 
Annual cost increased every year when insurgency started in 1996 and continued to grow until 
ceasefire agreement between the government and the insurgent signed in 2006. Thereafter the 
cost slightly decrease till the process of integration of the Maoist combatant into security force 
has completed in 2012. The annual cost of conflict does not end to this point, because hidden 
cost and indirect cost still contributing to this cost. The accumulated cost shown in the graph 
named total cost of the insurgency shows the behavior of cost as approximately linear growth. 
6.2.2 Scenario One: Insurgency and State Capacity 
In scenario one, the environment of insurgency dynamics will be changed by manipulating the 
effect of state capacity in the insurgency dynamics. In line with this assumption, the link between 
economy sector and insurgent/security force activity sector is switched off and also used the 
different value of state capacity to see model behavior and compared with base run scenario.  
State capacity, as discussed in the chapter three, is the 
function of economic performance, regime legitimacy, 
political capacity and social capacity. Polity index, civil 
liberties index, GDP index, employment index, literacy index 
and the governance index are taken as the determinants of 
state capacity. GDP index assumed as an endogenous 
variable depends on the growth of GDP from economic 
sector, and other indices are considered as exogenous 
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variable using time series data from different sources. The figure 6.2 above shows the state capacity 
index in base run scenario. 
The impact of state capacity assumed in this study as; effect on insurgent recruitment, security 
force resources and potential economic effect. The simulation result in figure 6.3 and 6.4 
explains the change in behavior when state capacity value assume as constant one compared to 
base case scenario in which it varies 0.75 to 1.75. 
 
Figure 6.3: Insurgency and State Capacity: - Maoist Insurgent and Security Force Total 
 
Figure 6.4: Insurgency and State Capacity: - Cost of Insurgency and Public Satisfaction with the Government 
The greater state capacity reduces, on the one hand, possibility of insurgent recruitment by 
compensating adverse effect of dissatisfaction of people toward the government and on the other 
it ensures sufficient resources to conduct security force activities. Similarly, greater state 
capacity compensates the adverse effect of insurgent/security force activities on the economy 
that further improves state capacity. When state capacity is switched off, the intensity of conflict 
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slows down, therefore, reduce the cost of conflict. It is because level of public satisfaction 
improves due to less suppressive actions by security forces. The impact of state capacity further 
tested by assuming different value of state capacity index as 0.1, 0.5, 0.75, 1.5, 2 and 5, the 
growth of active Maoist Insurgent and cost of insurgency shown in figure 6.5. 
  
Figure 6.5: Insurgency and State Capacity: - Active Maoist Insurgent and Annual Cost of Insurgency 
Low intensity of conflict can be seen when state capacity is above two and between 0.5 and 0.75 
times. The high intensity of conflict is noticed when state capacity lies below 0.5 and between 
one to two times. Strong state capacity ensures the government ability to control situation, 
therefore, reduce the intensity of conflict. Very weak state capacity benefited to the insurgent 
recruitment and ability to commit incidents, therefore, increase the conflict.  Cost of conflict is 
directly associated with a number of insurgent/security force and their activities.  
It can be argued from the above discussion that the government should focus on strengthening 
state capacity component such as governance, employment, literacy, human right so as to prevent 
people from supporting insurgency. Similarly, strong state capacity ensures government ability 
to manage conflict effectively. There is a dilemma in people’s perception during insurgency. On 
the one hand, people sought for security when insurgent commit violent incidents, on the other 
hand, greater use of force turned into dissatisfaction toward the government. In such situation, 
even the state has sufficient resources to combat insurgency; there actions should be very careful. 
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6.2.3 Scenario Two: Insurgency and the Population 
In the base scenario, time series data of population from 1996 are taken to capture the dynamics 
of population. In scenario two, the static data of population of 1996 is taken to comparing the 
difference in insurgency dynamics and its cost. The figure 6.6 shows how dynamics of 
population describes insurgency dynamics.  
 
Figure 6.6: Insurgency and the Population: - Active Maoist Insurgent and Security Force Total 
This scenario assumes that the more the size of population, the greater the possibility of having 
more conflicts in the country. It is because, the number of potential insurgent increased with the 
increment in population stock. Insurgent and security force both paid greater effort to influence 
more people on their side. These activities deepen the insurgency. The figure 6.6 clearly shows 
that when taking population of 1996 as constant, the insurgent number and security force fewer 
than the base scenario. 
The population, as discussed in Chapter Three, is in the center of gravity in this model, both state 
and counter state rely on the population for recruitment, shelter, intelligence and other support. 
They pursue their action for gaining popular support. Populace should be considered neutral and 
coercive supporter may not consider insurgent until they give clear support to the insurgent. 
Population support or oppose state or counter agent by providing information. The number of 
population is a key constant to measure the effect of actions, resource collections and GDP index 
in the model.  
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6.2.4 Scenario Three: Insurgency and Public Satisfaction 
Base case scenario evaluates the possible impact of public satisfaction in insurgency dynamics. 
Public satisfaction with the insurgent and the government is the function of their actions during 
insurgency. In this scenario three, it is assumed that actor’s activities do not affect the level of 
public satisfaction. The satisfaction still is in the same level as before.  The figures below present 
the result of the simulation and compare with the base case. Red line represents the simulated 
behavior when satisfaction with insurgent switch off, blue line satisfaction with the government 
switch off and green line represent base scenario.  
 
 
Figure 6.7: Insurgency and Public Satisfaction: - Active Maoist Insurgent and Security Force Total 
 
Figure 6.8: Insurgency and Public Satisfaction: - Annual Cost of Insurgency and Total Cost of Insurgency 
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The figures 6.7 and 6.8 show that the cost and the number of insurgent and security force grow 
remarkably when satisfaction with insurgent does not consider as the influence in insurgency 
dynamics. It is because insurgent incidents do not create an adverse effect on their recruitment 
through dissatisfaction of people. On the other hand, the number of insurgents reduced almost to 
zero, and the cost also decreased when public satisfaction with the government is switched off. It 
is because it does not support to the insurgent recruitment in the system, but continue decreasing 
their number through attrition and retirement. This scenario explains why the actors need to 
launch their coercive action without compromising public satisfaction. 
As discussed in chapter three, how people perceive their activities and to what extent these 
activities interfere people’s daily life determines public satisfaction or dissatisfaction toward the 
actors. Security force seeks support for intelligence to identify legitimate target. Similarly, 
insurgent need support to collect resource, employees and shelter. Public satisfaction measures 
the level of support or opposition to the actors. Dissatisfaction of people with one group favors 
the other and vice versa. Public satisfaction is the major engine of growth of insurgency 
dynamics. In this view, it is clear that the satisfaction of people is crucial to parties in the 
conflict. Both the insurgent and security force apply strategy to gain control and support of 
people. So, the government should always take into account public satisfaction even actions are 
in necessity. 
6.2.5 Scenario Four: Insurgency and Resources 
Both Insurgent and security forces require weapons, accessories and financial resources for their 
actions. The state to some extent, as a legitimate actor, has a benefit over the Maoist in relation 
to resource collection. The Maoist heavily relies on an internal source mainly include donation, 
extortion and other unpopular means of coercion. These resources collection activities and their 
impact on insurgency dynamics are modeled in base case scenario.   
This scenario four assumes that the insufficiency of resources does not matter in the insurgency 
dynamics and see how the behavior differs with the base case. If both insurgent and 
counterinsurgent are free of tension about resources, the dynamics of conflict even deepen and 
the cost of conflict will further increases as shown in figure 6.9 and 6.10.   
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Figure 6.9: Insurgency and Resources: - Active Maoist Insurgent and Security Force Total 
  
Figure 6.10: Insurgency and Resources: - Annual Cost of Insurgency and Total Cost of Insurgency 
However, insufficient or excess resource reduces the intensity of conflict. Under this assumption, 
resource capacity of both insurgent and security force is tested by taking the value of 0.5, 2, 3 
and five times. Inadequate resources limit their activities; therefore, intensity of conflict 
decreased in a significant level. Sufficient resource deepens conflict at beginning, but after some 
point the conflict intensity decreases. It is because sufficient resources support them to commit 
more insurgency and counterinsurgency activities that affect public satisfaction against them.  
The simulation result presented in figure 6.11. 
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Figure 6.11: Insurgency and Resources: - Active Maoist Insurgent and Security Force Total 
The aim of actors involved in the conflict, as discussed in chapter three, is to gain control and 
support of people, destroy opponent’s resources and improve international relationship. They 
collect funds through various means- popular and unpopular. Tax imposes, and coercive 
collections are unpopular ways that deteriorate their image in front of people. The Maoist mainly 
involves coercive collection during insurgency. Excess resource collection may not support them 
always. So, they should collect resource in such a way that do not create excess burden to the 
people. 
6.2.6 Scenario Five: Insurgency and Incident Suppression 
Base scenario describes how security force mobilized to control insurgent activities during 
insurgency. Insurgent incidents upset people, and they pressurize government to take action to 
stop such incidents. Use of coercive power reduce insurgent activities in the short run, but in the 
long run it activate insurgency creation loop due to an adverse effect on public satisfaction 
toward the government.  
The scenario five presents the idea that how the model behavior differ with the base scenario if 
the government does not involve in offensive acts. Incident suppression loop is switched off to 
cut off security force offensive actions. Then see how would the insurgency dynamics reacts and 
changes in the cost of the insurgency. In this situation, how the system should prevent the state 
from being captured by opponent. The simulated model behavior presented in figure 6.12 and 6.13. 
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Figure 6.12: Insurgency and Incident Suppression: - Maoist Insurgent and Security Force Total 
 
Figure 6.13: Insurgency and Incident Suppression: - Insurgent Recruitment Rate and Annual cost of Insurgency  
Scenario five assumes that the security force did not commit offensive suppressive actions with 
increased insurgent incident committed by the Maoist. If security force lay down the weapons, is 
there any possibility of being captured by the opponent? It is impractical to model the insurgency 
dynamics in such a way. The number and strength of the Maoist rely on three flows, as discussed 
in chapter four, as the recruitment, retirement and attrition of insurgent. The equation for 
insurgent attrition composed of attrition from suppression plus insurgent incidents*fractional 
attrition rate. It means that even the suppression actions by security force stopped, the attrition of 
insurgent does not stop in the system. The more incidents they commit, the higher their number 
of casualties. The recruitment stopped to zero because people do not perceive coercive action 
from the security force. However, insurgent incident creates dissatisfaction with the insurgent 
that affect adversely on their recruitment. In both cases whether they commit more incidents or 
security force commit less suppressive actions, the intensity of insurgency slow down. 
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The figure above clearly shows that if suppressive actions reduced to zero, the number of 
insurgents does not increase from the initial level rather decrease their number. However, the 
model does not consider the impact of coercive recruitment of people in the Maoist. As discussed 
in chapter three, coercive supporter may not be considered as insurgent until they give clear 
support to the insurgent.  
From the above discussion, it is clear that the system protect the security forces from being 
captured even if they stop offensive acts. Defensive strategy favors the security force rather than 
offensive one. Offensive strategy will only be beneficial if state has sufficient state capacity and 
can control insurgency in short time period with strong public support. 
6.2.7 Scenario Six: Insurgency and Insurgent Creation  
Base scenario explains how insurgent creation loop activates when insurgent suppression loop 
dominates the model. Scenario five discussed how insurgency developed if the suppressive 
actions by the security force reduce to zero.  
This scenario aims to present idea that how long insurgency survive, if the insurgency creation 
loop is switched off assuming that the Maoist activities rely on an initial number of insurgent and 
are not able to recruit people as active insurgent after insurgency starts. The figure 6.14 shows 
the model behavior of active Maoist insurgent and insurgent incidents. 
 
Figure 6.14: Insurgency and Incident Creation: - Active Maoist Insurgent and Insurgent Incidents  
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The figures 6.13 shows approximately linear decay behavior in both insurgent number and 
incidents when the insurgent creation loop is switched off. The insurgent number reduced to zero 
in 2010. However, this is not correct proposition in normal conflict situation. As discussed in 
section 3.3.4.1, when recruitment is greater than attrition the stock of insurgent increases and 
vice versa. So it can be concluded that the insurgency primarily rely on the insurgent number for 
their activities. The state should focus on moderating their recruitment base by applying long-
term and short-term strategies. In the long-run, the government should focus on strengthening 
state capacity by improving in governance, employment, legitimacy and economy. While, in the 
short-run, sincere effort should pay to improve public satisfaction by compensating adverse 
effect of their suppressive actions so as to maintain public support. 
6.2.8 Scenario Seven: Insurgency and War Weariness  
The base scenario describes from where war weariness message comes and how these messages 
affects insurgency dynamics. When intensity of conflict deepens with the greater number of 
insurgent incidents, the civil society, the human right activists and the people do worry about the 
war and create pressure for a peaceful solution of the conflict. War weariness messages come 
from the populace that influences the policy of usage and growth of security forces. Direct 
extreme condition test in section 5.3.5 explains how the behavior changes, if different time delay 
assumed about war weariness.  
This section under scenario seven has discussed how model behavior differs with the base case if 
the war weariness switched off. The model behavior presented in figure 6.15 and 6.16. 
 
Figure 6.15: Insurgency and War Weariness: - Active Maoist Insurgent and Security Force Total 
Active Maoist Insurgent
27,557
16,267
4,977
1996 2000 2004 2008 2012
Time (year)
p
eo
p
le
Active Maoist Insurgent : war weariness switch off
Active Maoist Insurgent : base run
Security Force Total
437,198
254,099
71,000
1996 2000 2004 2008 2012
Time (year)
p
er
so
n
Security Force Total : war weariness switch off
Security Force Total : base run
76 
 
  
Figure 6.16: Insurgency and War Weariness: - Annual cost of Insurgency and Total Cost of Insurgency 
Assumption of this scenario is that war weariness is not the part of the system. The government 
has not any pressure for dialogue, or the government ignores such pressure. The aim of security 
force is to control such incidents at any cost and means. In this scenario, the war becomes even 
higher than in the base case. Coercive actions generate adverse impact on public satisfaction that 
turned into support to the insurgent. Therefore; they can recruit more insurgent. This scenario 
develops reinforcing behavior in the system.  
War weariness messages are mainly pressure to the government for minimizing offensive 
activities and for peaceful settlement of the conflict. The government may ignore such messages 
due to legitimacy, security force strength and other political reasons. However, ignoring such 
messages may have counterproductive in term of lives and property lost even greater in number 
and value. However, the government should aware not to give time to insurgent for preparation 
of war even in great magnitude in the name of war weariness. The ideal way to handle the 
situation is to conduct activities with efficient intelligence so that the people feel safe and secure 
during operation. 
6.2.9 Scenario Eight: Insurgency and Hidden cost 
This scenario aims to present the idea that the cost of conflict not only covers the cost during 
conflict, but the country must bear after many years. There must be a number of veterans that 
need continued cost to take care of them. Scholars mentioned that the health care, disability and 
retirement cost for veterans from past wars came 30 to 40 years after those wars ended (DAO, 
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2011 cited on Supinajaroen, 2011). So after cost of conflict is unavoidable for the total costs of 
conflict and it must be calculated. Before the step of other considerations, the after-conflict cost 
must be implemented. This scenario adds structure of after-conflict cost shown in figure 4.5 and 
calculates it as part of the costs relevant. The after-conflict cost structure is tested by on its 
fraction and lifetime. First, the fraction of the cost that determine the rate of after-conflict cost is 
tested by the values 0.00, 0.10 (base run value), and 0.20 the results are shown in figure 6.17. 
 
Figure 6.17: Insurgency and Hidden Cost: - Annual cost of Insurgency and Total Cost of Insurgency  
The result shows that earliest stage of conflict the difference in cost is not clear, but after 2002 it 
shows clear picture and the gap increased year after year. Second, the lifetime of cost is tested by 
the values 10, 30(base run value), 60 years. The result in the figure 6.18 shows that annual after-
conflict cost is low when life time is earlier and vice versa. 
 
Figure 6.18: Insurgency and Life Time: - Annual Cost of Insurgency and Total Cost of Insurgency  
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Thus, the scenario shows that it is necessary to include the after-conflict cost to the cost of 
conflict. Cost component especially hidden cost is under perceived component during insurgency 
in Nepal. People talk about lives, business and infrastructure. Economic impacts are to some 
extent analyzed. So, after this scenario, the hidden cost of conflict added as one of the model 
structure and considered as part of insurgency costs. 
6.3 Discussion  
The purpose of this study is to examine the dynamics of insurgency evolution, mitigation and 
associated costs by simulation of conflict scenarios in Nepal. The simulation might help to 
answer the questions such as how the insurgency evolves? What are the conditions under which 
intensity of the insurgency depends on? To what extent the conflict affects economic 
performance of the country? The study results that there are two points of view need to be 
discussed as the generic model design and its usability and conditions at which intensity of 
insurgency and cost depends on. 
6.4 The Generic Model and its Usability  
The model covers a mechanism of insurgency dynamics and associated cost of the insurgency. 
The people, the Maoist and the government especially security force are the principal actors of 
insurgency dynamics. Public satisfaction covers how people perceive activities of the Maoist and 
the state. It is an important variable in the model that determines insurgent recruitment and also 
attrition from suppression. However, in term of the state capacity elements, the model does not 
cover all relation of state capacity element as endogenous variable. Only economic element has 
taken as endogenous. Time series data for other elements used to calculate state capacity. This 
formulation does not reflect much difference with the hypothesis. Therefore, the simulation for 
all scenarios indicate hypothesis of insurgency dynamics and costs.  
6.5 Conditions at which Intensity of Insurgency and Cost Depend 
The base scenario reflects environments of insurgency dynamics in Nepal. It describes how 
insurgency evolves, its intensity and its cost compared with reference data. The behavior 
generated by a generic model under base scenario is the product of the number of actor involve; 
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capacity poses; people’s perception about activities; and development of the element of the state 
capacity. Base scenario based on the assumptions that lack of understanding the entire dynamism 
of insurgency development and mitigation has contributed to the cost of the conflict. This part 
attempts to discuss on various possible conditions at which intensity and cost of insurgency rest on. 
6.5.1. Adjustment Time and Insurgency Dynamics 
This study aims to observe the behavior of the insurgency dynamics and its response over time. 
Time delay is an important consideration of any system dynamics modeling. Number of time 
elements assumed in this study. Changes in adjustment time produce different behavior in the 
system. Some variables are sensitive to the time delay and some are not. Extreme condition test 
in section 5.3.5 explains the impact of the time element on growth of the insurgency such as time 
to join the insurgency, an average career of insurgent, time to weary, time to create pressure, 
time to dissatisfy, and so on. Some of the time elements balance the effect of other time 
elements. For example, longer time to weary deepens the intensity of conflict, but longer time to 
dissatisfy balance this effect in the system. Similarly, shorter time to create pressure increases 
intensity of conflict while shorter war weariness compensates its result. 
6.5.2. Parameter and Insurgency Dynamics 
Some of the parameters are highly sensitive to the model behavior. Section 5.3.5 describes the 
sensitivity of parameter. Insurgent parameter, satisfaction parameter, economic effect parameter, 
maximum suppressive acts are some of the sensitive parameters in the model. The difference of 
the value of these parameters will lead to much difference in the model behavior. The sensitivity 
analysis in section 5.3.6 describes parameter sensitivity. However, there are compensating 
natures of these parameters. For example, high value of the satisfaction parameter will 
compensate low value of insurgent parameter and vice versa. 
6.5.3. Scenarios and Insurgency Dynamics 
Section 6.2 describes different possible conflict scenarios and explains how and to what extent 
the behaviors differ with the base scenario. This section explains in which condition these 
scenarios play remarkable contribution to deepening or weakens insurgency.  
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Scenario one assumes that the state capacity ensures resource availability to the security force; 
compensate adverse effects of insurgency to the economy and stop insurgent recruitment. 
Section 6.2.2 describes the impact of state capacity by taking different value of it. This scenario 
clearly shows that a strong state capacity reduces intensity of conflict significantly, because the 
security force may control insurgency without compromising level of public satisfaction. The 
cost of conflict will also be low because state capacity compensates an adverse effect of conflict 
to the economy. However, weak state capacity supports insurgent recruitment and ability to 
commit incidents. On the other hand, security force could not launch sufficient 
counterinsurgency operation due to lack of resources. Weak state capacity could not able to 
compensate bad result of the insurgency, therefore, increase an indirect cost of conflict. 
Moderate state capacity does not play higher impact on the system; other elements do play an 
import role in insurgency dynamism.  
Scenario two assumes changes in the population size affect the insurgency dynamics. However, 
compared to other scenarios, the intensity of conflict taking population stock constant or 
dynamic do not generate much difference in the system behavior.  
Scenario three assumes actors’ activities do not affect the level of public satisfaction. Section 
6.2.4 describes that if insurgent activities assume to be free with public satisfaction, the intensity 
of conflict increases; if security force activities do not create bad effect on public satisfaction, the 
intensity of conflict decreases. It is because dissatisfaction with the government is the engine of 
growth of the insurgency in this model. It is why the actors should try not to dissatisfy people 
while launching their strategies of the defeating enemy. As discussed in Chapter Three, they 
should be serious that direct or indirect actions against the opponent should not have an adverse 
impact on the people if they are pursuing long term strategy to achieve their goal. What is seen in 
Nepal that, especially, the Maoist, pursue a strategy of exciting and compelling security force to 
commit coercive actions so as to gain public sympathy. 
Scenario four describes if insurgent and security force has sufficient resource capacity to 
involve in the conflict, the intensity of conflict increase to some degree. However, insufficient 
resource capacity and excess resource capacity of both parties reduce intensity of conflict. 
Section 6.2.5 explains three time greater resource capacity of both actors increase insurgent 
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number at initial state but later it began to decrease sharply. This scenario explains that the 
inadequate resource reduces conflict intensity remarkably, but excess resource does not 
contribute to increasing the level of conflict. The scenario explains why both parties pursue 
strategy of destroying opponent resource as discussed in section 3.3.2 rather than to improve 
their resource capacity.  
Scenario five assumes the incident suppression loop switch off and none of offensive action by 
the security force. In this situation, the result shows that the intensity of conflict slows down. It is 
because, less coercive action by security force do not hamper public support on the on hand and 
do not favor insurgent recruitment on the other. However, the question arises that is there any 
possibility of being captured by the Maoist? It is not possible because defensive strategy keeps 
public support intact with the government that stops insurgent recruitment. They rely on a 
limited number.  In such situation, their number constantly reduces due to regular retirement and 
attrition when they commit offensive actions. The hypothesis that less use of power may have a 
chance of being captured is wrong. House searching, tedious checking in the highway and other 
offensive actions by security force becomes unpopular in Nepal that dissatisfies people turned 
into support to the Maoist. So it can argue that less coercive actions could be beneficial in the 
long run. 
Scenario six describes the intensity of conflict is low if the insurgent creation loop is switched 
off. Section 6.2.7 shows the insurgent number and cost of conflict reduced significantly if this 
formulation assumed to be true. According to this scenario, the security force should pursue a 
strategy of moderating insurgent recruitment. Security force should be aware of not to interfere 
civil life to prevent recruitment while committing suppressive actions. That requires their strong 
intelligence mechanism so that they can attack on a legitimate target, which is quite weak as 
discussed in chapter three.  
Scenario seven describes how war weariness affects insurgency dynamics and cost of conflict. 
Assumptions for this scenario are no war weariness and shorter and longer time delay to perceive 
war weariness. Section 6.2.8 describes that longer the time taken to recognize war weariness, the 
higher the intensity of conflict. The idea of war weariness is an important component of 
insurgency dynamics in the model. As discussed in chapter three, war weariness creates pressure 
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for dialogue and pulls back security force for a peaceful resolution. If there is no war weariness, 
the government use excessive force that dissatisfy people and strengthen insurgent recruitment, 
therefore, deepen the conflict even more. What everyone sees, as discussed above, in Nepal that 
the intensity of the violent incident grow sharply at initial stage, because war weariness has 
longer time delay to perceive.  
Scenario eight describes how after the insurgency cost contributes to increasing total cost of the 
insurgency in the long run. Insurgency has short-term as well as long-term impact in term of cost 
associated with it. It is the cost that directs variation to the intensive of conflict, and it comes 
with the lifetime approximated from the life of soldiers who came back and still alive. Section 
6.2.9 describes its impact can be seen many years even after the end of the insurgency. 
6.6 Summary 
All the insurgency scenarios seem to be costly in term of life, liberty, peace and economy. 
Whatever the scale of the insurgency, the country must bear such costs. The benefits may be if 
managed wisely; awareness, issues come into surface that are suppressed before and most 
importantly realization of truth. The Maoist came to mainstream politics and share power in 
government after peaceful resolution in 2006. However, the causes of conflict argued as 
discrimination, poverty, underdevelopment, unemployment and so on remain the same. The 
country still facing the problem of conflict and continue struggling to settle it with a peaceful 
manner. The election of second constitutional assembly held in late 2013 bring some hope of 
improvement in Nepal. From all scenario simulated, the intensity and cost of conflict could be 
minimized only if both parties in the conflict be responsible for the people; minimize aggression 
and coercive actions. Use of less military solution could be the best way for Nepal. What have 
seen in the simulation that the party who committed in minimum coercive activities benefited 
much and the cost to the economy also tolerable. 
  
83 
 
Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
 
 
7.1 Conclusion about General Model and its Implication 
Insurgency in Nepal ended with a comprehensive peace agreement in 2006. Thereafter, efforts 
were paid to establish permanent peace and security in the country. The pace for post-conflict 
reconstruction and resolution activities seems to be slow. Some of the issues in constitution 
making are still in debate. Political parties yet to reach in the agreement for forming a 
commission on truth and reconciliation. The second constitutional assembly elected in 2013 
supposed to make a new constitution within a year. With reference to Galtung’s approach to 
peace, Nepal furnished some of the peacekeeping and peacemaking activities, but still lacking in 
peace-building that constitute peaceful social change through socioeconomic reconstruction and 
development.  
The utility of the model designed in this study is not limited to insurgency in Nepal, rather the 
implication of understanding and analyzing the war on terrorism as a global insurgency. It 
indicates a shift in the primary emphasis for the conduct of the insurgency or counterinsurgency 
activities. The primary emphasis must shift to, and remain on the population. Instead of applying 
the majority of the resources to answering the insurgency with the military response, the 
insurgency analysis suggests that focusing on the insurgent’s support base and resources is a 
more efficient method of defeating them. The focus should be given to gain popular support and 
strengthen the security force intelligence ability to combat the insurgent while at the same time 
drain the insurgent’s ability to commit violent incident. 
For any conflict in the world, there have been many misunderstandings of insurgency in the 
world history. Such misunderstandings are insurgency itself and its consequences. The obvious 
and up to date case is a war on terrorism. First, a big mistake in estimation of military strategy 
and operation, by many reasons, the security forces underestimated of its opponents’ capability 
who led to the insurgency exist longer than their estimation. Second, they (policymakers) also 
ignored and used misperception of insurgency cost and insurgency dynamics as well 
(Supinajaroen, 2011).  
84 
 
This study finds that armed solution might not be a good answer for any conflict. The cost of 
armed conflict might always greater than its benefit. The core insight gained from this study is 
the self-examination of costs and dynamics of the insurgency that design the future of peace and 
security. The scenarios from this study have drawn this conclusion by the cost and dynamics of 
the Maoist insurgency in Nepal. On the basis of scenarios discussed in the previous chapter, the 
following recommendation placed for due attention to the policymaker to prevent burning 
possible future conflict and to handle properly if violent conflict started. 
 The insurgency should not be thought in the term of military itself, but it should be 
scrutinized in the top view of the national strategy and the implementation of state capacity 
elements. Otherwise, the win in the battlefield by military capability might lead to heavy loss 
to the country. Dynamic of the counterinsurgency operation is that all elements of state 
capacity must play a role. Military, diplomatic, socio-economic, governance and legislative 
efforts all must be synchronized and united toward achieving the common principal 
objective- the defeat of the insurgent and its underlying causes (see also section 6.2.2). 
 The main effort for the state must be to gain popular support. Canonica (2004) argued that 
first, popular support gives legitimacy to the conduct of operations, and the legitimacy 
required to operate freely and effectively to counter the insurgent. Second, support of the 
public provides the necessary intelligence to locate the insurgent members. They can no 
longer hide within the people. They lose the ability to move and operate freely their activities 
and the security force could commit counterinsurgency operation with legitimate target. 
Third, insurgents do also rely on public support, without the people's support to them, the 
resources needed for their survival and actions are no longer available. Fourth, gaining 
popular support removes the recruitment base from the potential insurgent. It is a slow 
process, especially in regions where current support for the state is nominal. Scenario three 
discussed in section 6.2.4 explains how dissatisfaction with one actor turned into support for 
other. If the state able to maintain public satisfaction level higher, the recruitment of the 
Maoist was minimum and for security force it is easy to control their possible activities. 
 The security force must limit the use of direct actions against the insurgent without having 
efficient intelligence so as to minimize innocent casualties. Scenario five discussed in section 
6.2.6 and scenario six in section 6.2.7 explains that the higher the suppressive actions leads to 
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the lower level of public satisfaction that facilitate insurgent recruitment and higher insurgent 
activities. It is because, effective use of direct action requires a high degree of intelligence on 
the target to reduce collateral damage that is a weak part of the security force in Nepal. 
Excessive force and/or collateral damage results in weak support from the population and the 
international community. According to Canonico (2004), that the use of excessive force only 
hinders the counterinsurgency effort. All effort to use direct action must be done with 
consideration for their effects on the main and secondary efforts. 
 As discussed in chapter three, a short and mid-range strategies should design to disrupt and 
control the insurgency. The long range strategy focuses on the ideological support to the 
insurgent and culture of violence. Culture of violence is the tendency to justify violence as a 
necessity. As long as the people continue to provide support to the insurgent there will 
continue to be a threat to the government. There are a number of ways to implement the 
strategies outlined by Dr. McCormick’s model discussed in chapter three. The key is to 
emphasize gaining and maintaining popular support for the campaign. Similarly, according to 
Upreti (2008) long-term security policy of the nation has to consider the potential security 
situations in the region and international level. The government should focus on restructuring 
of security forces (army, police, and intelligence) and ministries (home and defense) enable 
them to answer conflict. National Security Council should be guided by national security 
doctrine, international relations and economic policies with strong provision of civilian 
control and proper oversight from the parliament. 
 Continuous sincere effort must move toward socio-economic-political reform in post-conflict 
situation to prevent the country being trapped into further conflict. Although, according to 
Marks (2003) coercion provides the operational driving force behind insurgent expansion; it 
is the strategic environment of the failed state. Democracy has been corrupt and ineffective; 
the political class distracted and self-absorbed after 1990. Consequences in the economic and 
social spheres have accordingly been worsened. Leadership must set in place solutions that 
can provide the motivation for mobilization. 
 Scenario one in section 6.2.2 explains that the state capacity composed of economic, social, 
governance and polity index is an important variable of shaping the dynamics of insurgency 
and cost of conflict. Weak state might always fertile land for crimes and insecurity and is 
vulnerable of being trapped into conflict. Upreti (2008) argues that in Nepal ‘organized 
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crimes and insecurity continue and expand with activities like extortion, abduction, robbery, 
looting, narcotics smuggling, rape, girls trafficking, hunting and smuggling of rare animals. It 
will further expand if the state is not able to deal with transitional security. Hence, addressing 
transitional security requires improving the elements of national power including democracy 
and governance. 
 Insurgency, organized crimes and insecurity, as disused in chapter two, should not be limited 
to the burden of the country concerned, rather recognize the problem of the international 
community as a whole. The state should give emphasis in gaining support of the international 
community for moral and resource support. Scenario four in section 6.2.5 shows weak 
resource base of the state further deepens the conflict in the country. Exchange of intelligence 
information, cooperation and collaboration between the states and society are other areas of 
consideration for improving peace and security. 
 Hidden cost of the conflict is highly under perceived element of cost of the insurgency. 
Scenario eight in section 6.2.9 show that the hidden cost continue to grow even after the end 
of the insurgency. It has long term impact in the economy, therefore, should be given proper 
insight its effect and search for a better way of compensating its adverse effect. 
7.2 Future Research 
Finally, there are some points those are excluded and should be a challenge to study more. 
 The aggregate effect of insurgency on economy has been assumed in this study. However, 
each insurgency has different conditions. Thus for the Nepal, need to design more about the 
different area of the economy to examine how the insurgency increases or decreases the 
demand of the product of the sector and how the sector output supports or opposes to 
economic development. For example, tourism is to be considered the most affected economic 
area in Nepal. There is some argument, as discussed in chapter two, that military spending 
lead to positive economic growth by increasing aggregate demand which result in increased 
output and employment. However, this increase seems to be ‘heat from burning house.' 
Military spending crowds out productive investment; leads lower rate of growth and 
unemployment as well as increases lost output. Thus, the study requires further extension of 
economic aspects. A larger set of infrastructures could be included, such as communications, 
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the media, transportation, tourism education, agriculture, and manufacturing. This approach 
may facilitate to identify the most sensitive area of the economy in which the government 
could focus seriously so that bad result of the insurgency could be minimized in the future. 
 Strong state capacity considered as discussed in chapter six, to be an important element that 
compensate adverse effects of insurgency. A weak state becomes the fertile land for 
insurgency. In this study, the determinants of state capacity are taken several indexes on the 
basis of the literature review as polity, GDP, civil liberties, employment, literacy and 
governance. These factors except economic are considered as exogenous input to the system. 
However, to measure dynamic effect of these factors on the system, the model should be 
further extended making them endogenous variable in the system. It will help to point out 
measurable area of state capacity so that serious attention could be paid for improvement in 
the future. 
 The model developed in this study allows an analyst to take a very complex problem and 
gain insight into it by dividing it into manageable parts. It enables the analyst to aggregate 
assumptions about simpler questions such as the effectiveness of security force, the growth 
rate of the economy, direct and indirect cost of conflict. However, effects of propaganda, 
intelligence and government corruption are not considered separately while modeling due to 
unavailability of reliable data. The model need to further extended considering these 
elements and their effect in insurgency dynamics. 
 Security forces have been taken as a single entity for the purpose of this research. However, 
for effective analysis it is imperative to model them separately with recruitment, training, 
retirement, attrition. Data is needed on the effectiveness of the army, police officers, 
intelligence and other types of security forces. Security situation also depends on criminals 
and crime rate. There is a possibility to expand the model so as to incorporate criminals and 
crime for better understanding the security situation in the country. 
 The attitude of the populace should be simulated dynamically and could be used to simulate 
the outcome of the election. 
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Annex I: Security Forces in Nepal 
Current manpower of security forces, 2013 
Category 1990 1996 2001 2007 2012 Remarks 
Nepal Army 35000 46000 47411 92000 95000  
Armed Police Force   15156 25000 35000  
Civil Police 20000 46500 37783 48000 61171  
 55000 91500 99250 165000 191171  
Metropolitan Police   Established 
2006 
12000 13752  
 Source: Kumar (2007), Marks (2003), Dahal (2008),  www.nepalpolice.gov.np; 
www.nepalarmy.mil.np; www.apf.gov.np, World Bank Database 
Annex II: Timeline of Political Development in Nepal 
The history of modern Nepal begins with the unification by the King Prithvi Narayan Shah 
(1743- 1775). Before its emergence as a nation 'Nepal' was mostly applied only to the 
Kathmandu Valley and its history is mostly the history of the Kathmandu Valley (Shina, 1974). 
Power struggle among Bhardar and fraction inside the royal family had led to a period of 
instability after the death of King Prithivi Narayan Shah. The instability deepened after Sugauli 
Treaty that led the Kot Massacre in 1846 where almost all leading Bhardar killed and Jung 
Bahadur Rana emerged victoriously and founded the Rana Lineage. Kot is the place where the 
member of Bhardhari Sava (assembly of Bhardar) meets for discussion on the matter of 
government (Edwards, 1974). 
There are four major political event noticed from 1770 to 1951(when Nepal achieved 
democracy) which shift power from one family or elite group to another. In 1806, Thapa family 
gained a virtual monopoly in the political system; in 1846 Rana family reached a similar state; in 
1885 power shifted to Shamsher branch of Rana family; in 1934, a group of Shamsher Rana 
came into power. All political changes occurred through more or less massacre (Bajracharya et. 
Al. 1993:2). 
In 1951, Nepal achieved democracy and restored the status of the monarchy after the overthrow 
of the Rana oligarchy. In 1960 when king Mahendra suddenly dismissed the cabinet and 
dissolved the parliament. The king also banned political parties and imposed restrictions on the 
most fundamental human rights. In 1980, King Birendra declared a referendum on the future of 
Party less Panchayat system. In 1990, Panchyat System was replaced by multi-party 
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parliamentary democracy with a constitutional monarchy by popular movement called Jana 
Andolan I. 
In 1996, the Maoist raises armed by refusing fundamental premises of the constitution 1990 
aiming to overthrow kingship from the country and established democratic republic. In 2002, 
when the King take over all political power claiming to restore peace and security in the country, 
all political parties and the Maoist came to a twelve point agreement and launched a popular 
movement against the King. A popular movement in 2006 called second Jana Andolan against 
monarchy overthrow monarchy and established federal democratic system in Nepal (Khadka, 
1993: Brown, 1999; and Hachhethu and Gellner, 2009). In 2008, the constitutional assembly 
election held which elected the member of the assembly. The assembly was not able to deliver 
new constitution, finally in 2012, the assembly dissolved. In 2013, second constitutional 
assembly formulated through fresh election and supposed to deliver new constitution within a 
year.  
Annex III: Model Equations 
Sector 1: Insurgent and Security Force Activity 
Stocks 
Active Maoist Insurgent= INTEG (Insurgent Recruitment Rate-Insurgent Retirement Rate-Insurgent 
Attrition Rate, initial active insurgents): Unit =people 
Security Force Normal= INTEG (SF Normal Growth Rate, 71000), Unit = person 
Security Force Additional= INTEG ( Additional SF Growth Rate, 0), Unit = person 
Maoist Weapon and Resource= INTEG (Weapon and Resource Growth Rate-Weapon and Resource Loss 
Rate, initial Maoist Resources), Unit = NRs 
Flows 
Insurgent Recruitment Rate=IF THEN ELSE (Time<end of insurgency time, MAX ((Indicated 
Insurgents-Active Maoist Insurgent\)/time to join insurgency, 0)*insurgent creation switch, 0) Unit = 
person/year 
Insurgent Attrition Rate= Insurgent Incidents*fractional attrition rate + Attrition rate from suppression,  
Unit = people/year 
Insurgent Retirement Rate= Active Maoist Insurgent/avg insurgents career in years, Unit =person/year 
SF Normal Growth Rate= Security Force Normal*SF normal growth fraction, Unit = person/year 
Additional SF Growth Rate=IF THEN ELSE (Desired Security Force>Security Force Total, (Desired 
Security Force-Security Force Total)/Time to adjust desired SF, 0) Unit = person/year 
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Weapon and Resource Growth Rate= IF THEN ELSE (Desired Insurgent Weapon and Resources>Maoist 
Weapon and Resource, (Desired Insurgent Weapon and Resources - Maoist Weapon and Resource)/time 
to fulfill desired resource, 0), Unit = NRs/year 
Weapon and Resource Loss Rate= IF THEN ELSE (Time<=end of insurgency time, (Maoist Weapon and 
Resource/weapon and resource depletion time) + (Maoist Weapon and Resource*Ef of suppressive action 
on Insurgent Resources), 0) Unit = NRs/year 
(This measures the loss rate of weapon and resources. the stock of resources deplete at 
normal rate and plus loss from suppressive actions by the SF during insurgency). 
Variables 
Relative Weapon and Resources= (Maoist Weapon and Resource/Active Maoist Insurgent)/(initial Maoist 
Resources/initial active insurgents), Unit = Dmnl 
(This measures the relative per capita insurgent resources) 
Eff of Insurgent Resource on Incidents= 1-exp (-Relative Weapon and Resources*insurgent resource 
parameter), Unit = Dmnl 
Insurgent Incidents= IF THEN ELSE (Time<=end of insurgency time, MAX (Active Maoist 
Insurgent*incidents per insurgent*Eff of Insurgent Resource on Incidents, 0), 0), Unit = incidents/year 
(How many raids, snipping, bombings etc. are committed in total by all insurgents) 
Desired Insurgent Weapon and Resources = IF THEN ELSE (Time<=end of insurgency time, Active 
Maoist Insurgent*Required resource per person, 0), Unit = NRs 
War Weariness= SMOOTHI (Insurgent Incidents/ref incidents*war weariness switch, time to weary of 
insurgency, 0), Unit = Dmnl 
Pressure to Reduce Incidents= SMOOTHI (Insurgent Incidents/ref incidents, Time to create pressure, 0),  
Unit = Dmnl 
(This is the effect of incidents on the urgency felt by government to do something about it. 
The effect of this will be lagged in its outcomes). 
Eff of War Weariness on Desired SF= WITH LOOKUP (War Weariness, ([(0,0)-
300,1)],(0,1),(10.0917,0.890351),(24.7706,0.776316),(44.0367,0.635965),(72.4771,0.482456),(101
.835,0.355263),(140.367,0.219298),(186.239,0.114035),(237.615,0.0482456),(300,0) )) Units: 
Dmnl 
 (The wearier the public is with the war, the less security forces they maintain in the operation.) 
Eff of Pressure on Desired SF= WITH LOOKUP (Pressure to Reduce Incidents, ([(0,0)-
(300,500)],(0,0),(37,18),(72.4771,50.4386),(113.761,92.1053),(157.798,140.351),(197.248,203.947),(223
.853,263.158),(255.046,353.07),(277.064,418.86),(300,500) ))Units: Dmnl 
Desired Security Force= base SF Mobilized*Eff of Pressure on Desired SF*Eff of War Weariness on 
Desired SF, Unit = person 
Security Force Total=Security Force Additional + Security Force Normal, Unit = person 
Maximum SF Deployed= Security Force Total*fraction maximum SF deployed, Unit = people 
(Note that this variable includes the number of security forces used in the counter insurgency 
operation and is not representing the total security forces the country has.) 
SF Mobilized= IF THEN ELSE (Desired Security Force<Maximum SF Deployed, Desired Security 
Force, Maximum SF Deployed) Unit = person 
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Suppressive Act per Soldier= SMOOTHI (1-exp (-Suppressive parameter*Pressure to Reduce Incidents), 
Suppression response time, 0)*max Suppressive acts, Unit = actions/person/year 
(Acts of house searching, detainment etc. may lead to arrest of an insurgent. It is an 
increasing function of the pressure to reduce incidents with diminishing returns.) 
SF Suppressive Actions= IF THEN ELSE (Time<=end of insurgency time, SF Mobilized*Suppressive 
Act per Soldier*Eff of State capacity on SF resources*incident suppression loop switch, 0), Unit = 
actions/year 
(Total counter operation by all security forces and paramilitaries in the country including 
house searches, detained etc.) 
Relative Suppressive Actions= SF Suppressive Actions/ref suppressive actions, Unit = Dmnl 
Ef of suppressive action on Insurgent Resources= SMOOTHI (1-exp (-suppression fruitful 
parameter*Relative Suppressive Actions), time to create eff on resources, 0)*maximum effect on 
insurgent resources, Unit =Dmnl 
(This is an increasing function with a max at one.) 
Attrition rate from suppression= SF Suppressive Actions*Relative Active Maoist Insurgent*Suppressive 
Acts Success, Unit = person/year 
(The fractional attrition rate from operation) 
Suppressive Acts Success= base suppression success*Ef on Attrition Rate, Unit = person/action 
(This modifies how many insurgents will be captured per coercive act in the base case) 
Relative Active Maoist Insurgent= (Active Maoist Insurgent)/initial active insurgents, Unit = Dmnl 
(What is the effect of insurgent density on finding an insurgent?) 
Internal Source of Maoist Resources= Weapon and Resource Growth Rate*share of internal source, Unit 
= NRs/year 
Relative Insurgent/SF activity = (SF Suppressive Actions + Insurgent Incidents)/reference activity Unit = 
Dmnl/year 
Eff of State Capacity on Insurgent Recruitment= XIDZ (1, State Capacity ^elasticity of State Capacity to 
recruitment, 1) Unit = Dmnl 
Potential Insurgent Recruitment Fraction= (minimum insurgent fraction activated+ (Eff of 
Satisfaction on Insurgent Number/Eff on Insurgent Recruitment))*Eff of State Capacity on Insurgent 
Recruitment, Unit = Dmnl 
(It is the fraction of potential insurgents actually wants to take up arms) 
 Potential Insurgents=(fraction of people liable to join insurgency*Total population)-Active Maoist 
Insurgent. Unit = people 
Indicated Insurgents=  IF THEN ELSE (Potential Insurgents> (base insurgent fraction*Potential 
Insurgent Recruitment Fraction*Potential Insurgents), base insurgent fraction*Potential Insurgent 
Recruitment Fraction*Potential Insurgents, Potential Insurgents), Unit = person 
(This is how many insurgents there could be if they could immediately “join up" and pick up 
arms.) 
Total population = IF THEN ELSE (Switch Population=1, population time series, Population 1996), Unit 
= person 
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Population time series=WITH LOOKUP (Time, ([(1996, 0)-(2015, 4e+007)], (1996, 2.06905e+007), 
(2001, 2.31514e+007), (2011, 2.66208e+007), (2015, 2.85899e+007))), Unit = Dmnl/year 
Base insurgent fraction= INITIAL (initial active insurgents/Potential Insurgents), Unit = Dmnl 
(This is the base fraction of the population that will be attracted to insurgent activities) 
Constant 
Insurgent creation switch= 1 Unit = Dmnl 
War weariness switch= 1, Unit = Dmnl 
(1= War Weariness Loop On, 0 = War Weariness Loop Off) 
Incident suppression loop switch= 1, Unit = Dmnl 
(1 = Incident Suppression Loop on, 0 = Incident Suppression Loop off) 
Switch Population= 1, Unit = Dmnl 
(1= taking population time series, 0= considering population constant of 1996) 
Insurgency start switch= 1, Unit = Dmnl 
(1= insurgent open fire, 0= no insurgent incidents) 
Time to join insurgency= 0.5, Unit = Month 
Time to weary of insurgency= 3, Unit = year 
Time to create pressure= 1, Unit = year 
(Scaling factor for impact of incidents on pressure on the Govt) 
Time to adjust desired SF= 3, Unit = year  
avg insurgents career in years= 12, Unit = years 
(The number of years an insurgent will be active assuming that he is not captured) 
Time to fulfill desired resource= 1, Unit = year 
Suppression response time= 1, Unit = year  
End of insurgency time= 2006, Unit = year 
(Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in Nov. 2006 end the violent conflict and initiated 
the process of registration of Maoist Combatants in cantonment. Thereafter there is no direct 
confrontation between SF and Maoist Insurgents.) 
Time to create eff on resources= 0.5, Unit = year 
Insurgent resource parameter= 5, Unit = Dmnl 
(Availability of weapons rapidly escalates the effect of any incident) 
Max Suppressive acts= 0.2, Unit = actions/person/year 
(This is a limit on how many counter operation a soldier could commit per month) 
Minimum insurgent fraction activated= 0.1, Unit = Dmnl 
(There are always some discontents in most societies) 
Fractional attrition rate= 0.1, Unit = persons/incident 
(How many insurgents are captured or killed per incident?) 
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Initial active insurgents= INITIAL (5000), Unit = people 
Insurgent parameter= 2, Unit = Dmnl 
(This is the power that modifies the effect of public satisfaction with the government on 
Insurgent numbers. This power should be greater than 1) 
Reference activity= 100, Unit = activity 
Share of internal source= 0.85, Unit = Dmnl 
Ref incidents=  36, Unit = incidents/year  
Fraction maximum SF deployed= 0.6, Unit = Dmnl 
(Only about 60% of the force is available to commit to the counterinsurgency as the 
remaining troops are deployed to static security duties  such as protecting government 
offices, barracks and infrastructures),  
Attrition parameter= 0.5, Unit = Dmnl 
Base suppression success= 0.05, Unit = person/action 
(This modifies how many insurgents will be captured or killed per counter  operation in the 
base case) 
Population 1996= 2.06905e+007, Unit = people 
(Base population based on the year 1996 when insurgency broke out in the country) 
Suppressive parameter= 0.4, Unit = Dmnl 
(This causes the counter operation per soldier to have diminishing returns to the "pressure to 
reduce incidents". It should be set to be less than one.) 
Fraction of people liable to join insurgency= INITIAL (0.1275), Unit = Dmnl 
(Employment to population ratio in 1996 was 83%, hence 17% unemployed people may 
have potential stock of the population that Maoist could recruit. There are almost 50% male 
and 50% female. In Maoist insurgent the ratio of male and female is about 4:1, so 25% of the 
female are also being potential insurgent.) 
Incidents per insurgent= 0.2, Unit = incidents/person/year 
SF normal growth fraction= INITIAL (0.025), Unit = Dmnl/year 
(Annual growth of SF in normal situation is based on data from 1983 to 1991. the growth is 
calculated as (Pt1/Pt0) ^1/n -1. where P=SF personnel t1 =present time, t0=initial time and 
n=number of period) 
Base SF Mobilized= 6000, Unit = person 
Initial Maoist Resources= Required resource per person*5000, Unit = NRs 
Weapon and resource depletion time= 2, Unit = year 
(Most of the part of Maoist resources used in food, shelter, clothing and other accessories. 
the resources collected each year also used accordingly. the weapons and some accessories 
have longer life time. so in an average, it is assumed, the collected resources will depreciate 
at 2 year time period.) 
Required resource per person= 36000, Unit = NRs/person 
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(This is the insurgent weapon and resource per person including insurgent army accessories, 
food, clothing, shelter and weapons. Insurgents are voluntary fighter against the state; hence 
need to assume monthly payment as salary or allowance. Even though most of the cost they 
collect free of cost from villagers using coercion such as food, shelter. However, this is the 
shift of burden to the people should count in the cost of insurgency in a low case scenario 
this expenditure assumed 3000 NRs per person per month and 5000 NRs per person per 
month in high case) 
Suppression fruitful parameter= 0.5, Unit = Dmnl 
SF resource parameter= 5, Unit = Dmnl 
Maximum effect on insurgent resources= 0.75, Unit = Dmnl 
Ref suppressive actions= 25, Unit = actions/year 
Sector 2: Public Satisfaction 
Stocks 
Public Satisfaction with the Government= INTEG (  Chg in Satisfaction with the Gov, 1), Unit = 
Dmnl 
(This is an index of how satisfied the public are with government. Note that there is a first-
order delay between the indicated satisfaction as a function of current SF suppressive acts 
and the change in perceptions by the people.) 
Public Satisfaction with the Maoist Insurgent= INTEG (Chg in Satisfaction with Insurgent, 1), Unit = 
Dmnl 
(This is an index of how satisfied the public are with insurgent. Note that there is a first-
order delay between the indicated satisfaction as a function of current Insurgent incidents 
and the change in perceptions by the people.) 
Flows 
Chg in Satisfaction with the Gov= (Indicated Public Satisfaction with the Gov-Public Satisfaction with 
the Government) /IF THEN ELSE (Indicated Public Satisfaction with the Gov>Public Satisfaction 
with the Government, time to satisfy, time to dissatisfy)*switch satisfaction with gov, Unit Dmnl/year 
(This measures how quickly public satisfaction with government changes. Note that the time 
for satisfaction to decrease and to increase is different) 
Chg in Satisfaction with Insurgent= (Indicated satisfaction with the Maoist-public Satisfaction with the 
Maoist Insurgent\)/IF THEN ELSE (Indicated satisfaction with the Maoist>public Satisfaction with the 
Maoist Insurgent, time to satisfy, time to dissatisfy)*switch satisfaction with insurgent, Unit = Dmnl/year 
Variables 
Eff of internal source on population= Internal Source of Maoist Resources/Total population, Unit = Dmnl 
Eff of Insurgent Incidents on Civil Life= Insurgent Incidents/Total population, Unit = 1 
Indicated satisfaction with the Maoist= MIN (XIDZ (1, (Eff of Insurgent Incidents on Civil Life/ref effect 
of insurgent incidents + effect of internal source on population/ref effect of resource collection) 
^satisfaction parameter, 1), 1) 
 Unit = Dmnl 
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Eff of Suppressive Actions on Civil Life= (SF Suppressive Actions/Total population), Unit = 
actions/person/year 
(How much is the average citizen aware of counter operation by the Government?) 
Indicated Public Satisfaction with the Gov= MIN (XIDZ (1, (Eff of Suppressive Actions on Civil 
Life/ref eff of suppressive actions) ^satisfaction parameter, 1), 1), Unit = Dmnl 
(This is how satisfied the people would be with government absent any legacy effects. It's 
primarily determined by the government interference in civil life through coercive acts.) 
Ef on Attrition Rate= IF THEN ELSE (insurgency start switch=1, Public Satisfaction with the 
Government ^attrition parameter, 1), Unit = Dmnl 
(This is a multiplier that affects coercive fruitfulness depending on public satisfaction with 
the government. If the public are highly dissatisfied, they will make it difficult for the SF 
suppressive acts to result in capturing an insurgent). 
Eff on Insurgent Recruitment= XIDZ (1, public Satisfaction with the Maoist Insurgent, 1) ^insurgent 
parameter, Unit = Dmnl 
Eff of Satisfaction on Insurgent Number= XIDZ (1, Public Satisfaction with the Government, 1) 
^insurgent parameter, Unit = Dmnl 
Constant 
Switch satisfaction with insurgent= 1, Unit = Dmnl 
(1= open satisfaction/dissatisfaction with insurgent, 0= ignore satisfaction with insurgent) 
Switch satisfaction with gov= 1, Unit = Dmnl 
(1= consider public satisfaction with the government, 0= ignore public satisfaction with the 
government) 
Time to dissatisfy= 0.5, Unit = year 
(Time needed to upset the public) 
Time to satisfy= 3, Unit = year 
(Time needed to satisfied the public) 
Ref effect of suppressive actions= 0.0001, Unit = actions/person/year 
(Scaling factor for public Satisfaction) 
Ref effect of resource collection= 100, Unit = NRs/person/year 
Ref effect of insurgent incidents= 0.0001, Unit = incidents/person/year 
Satisfaction parameter= 0.44, Unit = Dmnl 
(This should be set to less than one to ensure diminishing returns to coercive acts) 
Sector 3: Impact of Insurgency on Economy (Non-military effect) 
Stock 
GDP at Normal Situation= INTEG (Normal GDP Growth Rate, 3.51087e+011), Unit = NRs2001 
GDP at Insurgency= INTEG (GDP at Insurgency growth rate, 3.51087e+011), Unit = NRs2001 
(Nominal GDP is taken as base of 1990) 
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Economic Effect of Insurgency= INTEG (Economic Effect Increase Rate, 0), Unit = Dmnl 
Flows 
Economic Effect Increase Rate= Gap of Economic Effect/Time to adjust gap of economic effect, Unit = 
Dmnl/year 
(This is the desire of the government to pull out of security forces from the operation and try 
to settle disputes in peaceful manner due to weariness with the insurgency.) 
GDP at Insurgency growth rate= GDP at Insurgency*Effective GDP Fraction, Unit = NRs2001/year 
Normal GDP Growth Rate= GDP at Normal Situation*gdp normal growth fraction, Unit = NRs2001/year 
Variable 
Potential Economic Effect= (1-XIDZ (1, "relative Insurgent/SF activity"*(1/State Capacity), 1) 
^economic effect parameter\)*economic effect switch Unit = Dmnl 
Gap of Economic Effect= Potential Economic Effect-Economic Effect of Insurgency, Unit = Dmnl 
Real GDP per capita= GDP at Insurgency/Total population, Unit = NRs2001/person 
Loss of Nepal GDP= IF THEN ELSE (GDP at Insurgency growth rate>Normal GDP Growth Rate, 0, 
Normal GDP Growth Rate-GDP at Insurgency growth rate), Unit = NRs2001/year 
Effective GDP Fraction= IF THEN ELSE (economic effect switch=1, gdp normal growth fraction*(1-
Economic Effect of Insurgency), gdp normal growth fraction), Unit = Dmnl/year 
gdp deflector = WITH LOOKUP (Time, ([(1996,0)-(2015,500)], (1996,70.8979), (1997,76.0586), 
(1998,79.183), (1999,86.22),(2000\,90.0762), (2001,100), (2002,103.935), (2003,107.126), 
(2004,111.589), (2005,118.418), (2006,127.14), (2007,136.807), (2008,144.495\), (2009,167.482), 
(2010,192.85), (2011,212.977), (2012,231.599) )), Unit = NRs/NRs2001 
Additional SF expenditure= Security Force Additional*annual security expenditure per person, Unit = 
NRs/Month 
"GDP growth rate %"= TREND (GDP at Insurgency, time horizon to measure growth rate, initial real 
GDP growth rate)*100. Unit = Dmnl/year 
(Number of person could be converted to insurgents, if the condition is right). 
Constant 
Economic effect switch= 1, Unit = Dmnl 
(1= economic effect of insurgency switch on; 0 = no economic effect of insurgency) 
Economic effect parameter= 0.17, Unit = Dmnl 
Time to adjust gap of economic effect= 3, Unit = year 
Time horizon to measure growth rate= 1, Unit = year 
Initial real GDP growth rate= 0.05328, Unit = Dmnl/year 
Initial GDP per capita= 14891, Unit = NRs2001/person 
Elasticity of State Capacity to recruitment=  0.5 Unit = Dmnl 
GDP normal growth fraction= 0.062, Unit = Dmnl/year 
(The average growth rate of nominal GDP based on the growth of 1991 to 1995 which was 
average 4.9%. The ninth and 10th plan fixed the target of 6% and 6.2% growth target in a 
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normal situation respectively. However, the Tenth plan fixed its target of 4.3% in high 
conflict scenario. If the situation is normal, Nepal could have been achieving its target. It is 
assumed normal growth rate during the simulation period is 6 %.) 
Sector 4: Cost of Insurgency 
Stock 
Cantonment Cost= INTEG (Cantonment Cost Growth Rate, 0), Unit = NRs 
After Insurgency Cost= INTEG (After Insurgency Cost Growth Rate-After Insurgency Cost Decrease 
Rate, 0), Unit = NRs 
Total Cost of Insurgency= INTEG (Total Cost Growth Rate, 0), Unit = NRs 
Flows 
After Insurgency Cost Growth Rate= (Additional SF expenditure + Integration Cost of Insurgency into 
SF)*fraction of after insurgency cost, Unit = NRs/Month 
After Insurgency Cost Decrease Rate= After Insurgency Cost/life time of after insurgency in effect, Unit 
= NRs/Month 
Cantonment Cost Growth Rate= IF THEN ELSE (Time>=end of insurgency time: AND: 
Time<=integration time, number of insurgent in cantonment*expenditure per person per year in 
cantonment, 0) Unit =NRs/Month 
Total Cost Growth Rate= Cost of Insurgency, Unit = NRs/Month 
Variables 
Maoist Voluntary Retirement Cost= IF THEN ELSE (Time=integration time, number of insurgent 
voluntarily retired*retirement cost per person, 0), Unit = NRs 
Maoist Insurgent Expenditure= Weapon and Resource Growth Rate, Unit = NRs/year 
(Initial resource is necessary for launching insurgency. it is assumed that insurgent should 
have  sufficient resources and weapons to cover at least one year expenditure at the 
beginning. this figure comes insurgent number*required resources per person for six month ) 
Cost of Insurgency= (Additional SF expenditure + After Insurgency Cost + Cantonment Cost Growth 
Rate + Integration Cost of Insurgency into SF + Maoist Insurgent Expenditure + Maoist Voluntary 
Retirement Cost)/ (gdp deflector/100) + loss of Nepal GDP, Unit = NRs2001/year 
Integration Cost of Insurgency into SF= IF THEN ELSE (Time>=integration time, number of Maoist 
integrated*annual security expenditure per person, 0), Unit = NRs/year 
Cost of insurgency % of GDP"= Cost of Insurgency/GDP at Insurgency*100 Unit = Dmnl/year 
annual security expenditure per person= WITH LOOKUP ( Time, ([(1996,0)-(2015,210000)], 
(1996,65500),(1997,60200),(1998,66700),(1999,76300),(2000,101000),(2001,125000),(2002,151000),(20
03,146000),(2004,142000),(2005,151000),(2006,160000),(2007,186000),(2008,224000),(2009,241000),(
2010,262000) )), Unit = NRs/person/year 
Constant 
Number of insurgent voluntarily retired= 15610, Unit = person 
Retirement cost per person= 700000, Unit = NRs/person 
Fraction of after insurgency cost= 0.1, Unit = Dmnl/Month 
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Life time of after insurgency in effect= 30, Unit = Month 
Expenditure per person per month in cantonment= 6000, Unit = NRs/person/Month 
Number of insurgent in cantonment= 19602, Unit = person 
Number of Maoist integrated= 1460, Unit = person 
Integration time= 2012, Unit = year 
(The integration process has concluded in Dec 2012 and 1460 combatants join Nepal Army 
in different rank and remaining were retired voluntarily by giving lump sum amount to 
them.) 
Sector 5: State Capacity 
Variables 
State Capacity= IF THEN ELSE (switch state capacity=1, IF THEN ELSE (switch other indices=1, other 
indices\*GDP Index , GDP Index), 1) Unit= Dmnl 
Eff of State capacity on SF resources= 1-exp (-State Capacity ^SF resource parameter), Unit = Dmnl  
Other indices= Civil Liberties Index*Employment Index*governance index*Literacy Index*Polity Index, 
Unit = Dmnl 
Governance index= WITH LOOKUP (Time, ([(1996,0)-2015,2)], (1996,1), (1997,0.742386), 
(1998,0.742386), (1999,0.704315), (2000,0.704315), (2001,0.529188), (2002,0.529188), (2003,0.5), 
(2004,0.333756), (2005,0.335025), (2006,0.428934), (2007,0.465736), (2008,0.461929), 
(2009,0.440355), (2010,0.428934), (2011,0.431472) )), Unit = Dmnl 
Employment Index= WITH LOOKUP (Time,([(1996,0)-(2015,1.5)], (1996,1), (1997,1.0098), 
(1998,1.01961),(1999,1.03554),(2000,1.03064),(2001,1.01348), (2002,1.01716), (2003,1.01961), 
(2004,1.01716), (2005,1.0098), (2006,1.0049),(2007,1.00245), (2008,1.00613), (2009,1.00613), 
(2010,1.00735) )), Unit = Dmnl 
Literacy Index= WITH LOOKUP (Time, ([(1996, 0)-(2015, 5)], (1996, 1), (2001, 1.21434), (2009, 
1.47739), (2010, 1.50662))), Unit = Dmnl 
Civil Liberties Index= WITH LOOKUP (Time,([(1996,0)-(2015,2)], (1996,1),(1997,1), 
(1998,1),(1999,1),(2000,1),(2001,1),(2002,1),(2003,1),(2004,1.25),(2005,1.25),(2006,1),(2007,1),(2008,1
),(2009,1),(2010,1),(2011,1),(2012,1) )), Unit = Dmnl 
GDP Index= real GDP per capita/initial GDP per capita, Unit = Dmnl 
Polity Index= WITH LOOKUP (Time, ([(1996,0)-(2015,10)], (1996,1), (1997,1), (1998,1), 
(1999,1),(2000,1),(2001,1),(2002,1.33333),(2003,1.66667),(2004,1.66667),(2005,2),(2006,1.66667),(200
7,1.66667),(2008,1.33333),(2009,1.33333),(2010,1.33333),(2011,1.33333),(2012,1.33333) )), Unit = 
Dmnl 
Constant 
Switch other indices= 1, Unint = Dmnl 
(1= consider the effect of economic, social, governance, and polity index, 0 = ignore the 
effect of economic, social, governance, and polity index) 
Switch state capacity= 1, Unit = Dmnl 
(1= consider state capacity in insurgency dynamism, 0= ignore state capacity) 
